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I. INTRODUCMION
Indeed the Idols I have loved so long
Have done my Credit in Men's Eye much wrong:
Have drown'd my Honour in a shallow Cup,
And sold my Reputation for a Song.'
A. Prologue
On April 29, 1993, President Clinton nominated his friend, Lani
Guinier, to be Assistant Attorney General for the civil rights division
in the Department of Justice.2 On June 3, 1993, President Clinton
withdrew her nomination.3
Within that small timeframe, conservative politicians and the
press grossly distorted Lani Guinier's works and beliefs. The White
House never offered an intelligent rebuttal. Lani Guinier could have
addressed these mischaracterizations of her scholarship at her Senate
confirmation hearing. Instead, the White House pleaded with Guinier
to remain silent4 and pressured her to withdraw.5
The day Clinton nominated Guinier, the closely watched 100-day-
mark polls netted him the lowest approval rating of any postwar Presi-
dent.6 Guinier's silencing was one of several damage-control strate-
gies the President used to save a presidency in crisis.
The "borking' '7 of Guinier clarifies the need to expand the scope
of confirmation reform. Proposals must encompass not only those
1. OMAR KHAYYAM, RUBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM LXIX, at 21 (Edward
Fitzgerald trans., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1948) (1859).
2. Bob Cohn, So Long, Lani, NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1993, at 26, 27.
3. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Joe Davidson, Clinton Pulls Plug on Choice for Rights Post,
WALL ST. J., June 4, 1993, at A16.
4. Neil A. Lewis, Aides Say Clinton Will Drop Nominee for Post on Rights, N.Y.
TnaEs, June 3, 1993, at Al.
5. Birnbaum & Davidson, supra note 3, at A16.
6. Amy Bayer, Clinton's Early Rating in Polls Ranks Lowest of Postwar Presidents,
SAN DIEGO UNION-T~m., Apr. 29, 1993, at A14.
7. "Borking" refers to the strategy used by the Block Bork Coalition and others to
doom the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court in 1987.
See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING Up THE FEDERAL AP-
POINTMENTS PROCESS 132-33 (1994). The goal was to arouse the American public's resist-
ance to Bork's confirmation as quickly as possible and thus paralyze the Senate. lit at 14.
This ,in turn would buy the opposition time so that a more tempered and accurate case
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drafted with Supreme Court Justiceships in mind-in our post-Bork
and Thomas days-but also other Article II, Section 28 nominees
as well. Whatever opinion is formed about the desirability of
Guinier's ideas and solutions, one conclusion is unavoidable: The ex-
ecutive confirmation process works to the detriment of the American
people.
B. Reality Check
Lani Guinier's life's work has been "to try to find the rules that
can best bring us together as a democratic society."9 Her work ex-
plores both rules used in the voting process to elect public officials and
legislative rules used to determine the allocation of power once offi-
cials are seated.10 To understand Guinier's proposals, two related
concepts must be defined.
The first is what she calls the "Madisonian Majority."" This ideal
is what Madison envisioned necessary to achieve equal and fair repre-
sentation of diverse interests. 2 It is premised upon the assumption
that the majority is not a fixed group of individuals who always "win";
instead, it is composed of a constantly variable group of individuals
who make up the majority on any given issue.' 3 Change the issue,
change the composition of the majority. This "rule of shifting majori-
ties"' 4 means that sometimes individuals will win and sometimes they
will lose. But the participants' ability to take turns deepens faith in
the fairness of the system. 5
Majority tyranny arises, however, "[w]hen the majority is fixed
and permanent."' 6 The majority then wields total power and need not
answer to the minority's protestations when implementing its will be-
could be prepared against Bork's confirmation. Id. To achieve this difficult task, all argu-
ments that successfully scared the American public into believing that Bork was not only
wrong but dangerous in his world views were considered legitimate to advance, even if they
were unfair. See id. at 133.
8. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution states the president
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint...
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9. LANI GUINMR, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAoRITY: FuDAmErNAL FAiRNEss IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 6 (1994) [hereinafter TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRrrY].
10. See id.
11. Id. at 4.
12. See id.
13. It
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Id.
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cause this majority is always winner-take-all. As Guinier notes, "It]he
Golden Rule principle of reciprocity"'17 is discarded and thus nothing
is left "to check the tendency of a self-interested majority to act
tyrannically."' 8
Fixed and permanent majorities arise when the rules of decision
making do not protect the minority.19 The phenomenon of majority
tyranny, and its obliteration of the ideal Madisonian Majority, is the
evil that Guinier seeks to eradicate by uncovering the consequences of
letting such a tyranny reign, and offering solutions to counteract its
occurrence. One consequence of preserving fixed majorities may be
the loss of "incentive to follow the Golden Rule principle of shifting
majorities" 20 and subsequent refusal to "cooperate with the minor-
ity."21 When this occurs, "the minority never gets to take a turn."
22
The overall solution to this problem is to "[s]tructur[e] decisionmak-
ing to allow the minority 'a turn' .... [This] does not mean the minor-
ity gets to rule; what it does mean is that the minority gets to influence
decisionmaking and the majority rules more legitimately."'
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its amendments (the Act)24
are the raw material with which Guinier works to suggest remedies for
second, and now third, generation cases. The first generation of civil
rights activism motivated the Act's passage. Various devices such as
literacy tests, registration procedures, and actual physical resistance
deprived black' voters of access to the ballot.26 The Act outlawed
these injustices and resulted in a significant increase in black
registration.27
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
25. Guinier prefers the term "black" over "African-American" because "[t]he term
black succinctly describes a racial identity and status based on color that is shared, to some
degree, by other people of color with different ancestral lineages." Lani Guinier, The Tri-
umph of Tokenism; The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89
MicH. L. R-v. 1077, 1078 n.1 (1991), reprinted in TYRANNY oF THE MAJORrrY, supra note
9, at 202 n.1. Likewise "the black community is a convenient proxy for an insular group
that is politically cohesive, historically stigmatized, economically depressed, and socially
isolated." Id. at 203 n.1.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
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Second generation activism agitated for an end to "'qualitative
vote dilution.' "28 After blacks safely began to attend the polls in
greater numbers, southern states and localities replaced neighbor-
hood-based districts with representatives elected on a jurisdiction-
wide at-large basis.29 This enabled bare majority-white voting blocs to
continue to elect only white candidates.30 Thus, while all citizens,
black and white, each had one vote, the black vote was diluted until it
became ineffectual and, for all practical purposes, impotent to influ-
ence the results of any election.3 '
The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act acknowledged
the fact that "[p]olitical empowerment means equal voting weight and
equal voting power."32 To that end, a violation was defined as "a de-
nial of an equal opportunity to 'participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of [the minority groups'] choice.' ,,33 Major-
ity-black single-member districts replaced at-large districts, thus en-
suring that "[e]ven if whites continued to refuse to vote for blacks,
there would be a few districts in which whites were in the minority and
powerless to veto black candidates." 34
The third generation of activism confronts the reactive phenome-
non of legislative rule changes made by incumbent whites. Such
changes are intended to prevent duly elected minority representatives
from wielding any actual legislative power once they take office.3 1 In
Texas, for example, the first Latina ever elected to a local school
board in that state showed up to find where once it took one vote to
get an item on the agenda, now it took two.36 Similarly, newly elected
black county commissioners went to work in Alabama only to find
that their individual duties had been shifted to either the entire com-
mission, voting by majority rule, or to an appointed administrator.3 7
This new crop of "ingenious strategies devised to enforce white
supremacy, '38 like their predecessors in the ballot access and vote eq-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Lani Guinier, No 7Wo Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REv. 1413, 1422 (1991), reprinted in TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRrry, supra note 9, at 72.
33. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
34. Id. at 7-8.
35. See id. at 8.
36. Id. at 9.
37. Id. at 8 (citing Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 825-27 (1992)).
38. Id.
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uity arenas, silences black voices and keeps minority interests
invisible.
Because racist strategies are often procedural in execution,
Guinier's solutions focus on procedure.3 9 Her preferred solution is
cumulative voting,40 a process by which the number of votes each
voter may cast depends upon the number of seats up for election.
Thus, if three seats are open on the ballot, the voter has three votes.
The voter may cast those votes as a bloc for one seat or split them
between two or all three seats. Often, coalitions are formed between
groups who then vote strategically as a bloc. This voting scheme may
result in the election of minority candidates who otherwise would not
have been elected had "straight" voting been the official procedure. 1
Cumulative voting has often been used for a variety of elections
42
"because it is more sensitive than simpler balloting methods to inten-
sity of voter preference."'43 The idea of using cumulative voting as a
remedy for racial discrimination in electoral schemes is new.44 Yet the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees fair and effective representation
and commands that individuals be given an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the voting process. 45 Cumulative voting achieves this con-
stitutional mandate when illegal voting schemes have denied minority
voters effective representation.
Another alternative Guinier "cautiously '46 explores is
supermajority voting.47 It is important to note that Guinier's proce-
dural suggestions are not proxies for suggested outcomes. As she ex-
plains, "[t]he purpose is not to guarantee 'equal legislative outcomes';
equal opportunity to influence legislative outcomes regardless of race
is more like it."'48
39. Id. at 14.
40. Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of
the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1589, 1595-96, 1632-42 (1993), reprinted in TYR-
ANNY OF =u MAJonrrv, supra note 9, at 123, 149-56; Guinier, supra note 32, at 1463,
reprinted in TYRANNY OF =HE MAoRIT, supra, at 94-95; see Guinier, supra note 25, at
1138-40.
41. TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrrY, supra note 9, at 14-15.
42. Many corporations use cumulative voting to elect boards of directors. Id. at 15.
Some local municipalities and county governments also use cumulative voting. I&. For
example, Chilton County, Alabama, adopted cumulative voting in school board and county
commission elections. Id.
43. CARTER, supra note 7, at 41.
44. Id.
45. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
46. TYRANNY OF THE MAJomrY, supra note 9, at 16.
47. Id
48. Id at 14.
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C. The Journey Toward Political Redemption
Lani Guinier was an outstanding candidate for Assistant Attor-
ney General for Civil Rights but was denied the opportunity to serve
her country for three principal reasons: a misrepresented paper trail,
a media smear campaign, and irresponsible politics. The country
needs to attract outstanding individuals to fill powerful executive
branch positions. The federal government, the press, and the public
should protect the country's ability to do so. Presently, the White
House and the Senate encourage leading academes, who are often the
nominees for these positions, to suppress their ideas in academic liter-
ature and public forums for fear that controversy will bar them from
public service.49
Even as the media distorted Guinier's ideas beyond recognition
and used ugly racial code words to stir readers' deep prejudices, 50 the
White House warned Guinier not to respond.5 1 She was never given a
chance. With political strains building from other matters,52 President
Clinton ultimately silenced Guinier by denying her a confirmation
hearing5 3 Guinier could have set the record straight during her hear-
ing and may have subsequently been confirmed. Similar seemingly
doomed nominations have been cured in this manner, some at the
same time Guinier was told to go home.54
While debate continues to rage over what reforms should be im-
plemented in the judicial confirmation process, the state of executive
appointments is being ignored.5:5 This is a mistake. We must return to
the Founders' original approach to appointing Cabinet and sub-Cabi-
net positions-an approach rooted in the Advice and Consent
Clause-representative of the hard-fought compromise in the struggle
to define the separation of powers.56
Therefore, this Comment frames a simple, realistic procedural
rule reform that helps return us to a method of appointing executive
branch officials consistent with both the Founders' original under-
standing and the first century of practice in this country. The proposal
serves the bifurcated purpose of attracting good people to public ser-
49. See infra notes 90, 174-76, 243-46, 283-84 and accompanying text.
50. See infra part III.B-C.
51. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
52. See infra part H.
53. See infra part IV.D.1.
54. See infra part V.A.1.
55. For a rare exception, see CARTER, supra note 7.
56. See infra part V.B.
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vice and protecting their reputations by giving them an opportunity to
rebut the portrayals offered of them by others. Implementation of
this proposal will prevent other highly qualified individuals deserving
of this country's consideration from getting "Guiniered"T: Bipartisan
politics and a collaborative press will not force the president to silence
a nominee before giving the candidate a chance to speak for herself.
Our journey toward political redemption begins in Part II, which
analyzes the political climate during the spring of 1993 and the key
events that collaterally fueled President Clinton's decision to with-
draw Guinier's nomination.
Part III examines Guinier's attacked writings and compares the
conservative press's vicious "quota queen" accusation5" with both
Guinier's law review articles as originally published and their updated
counterparts. Guinier collects the latter with new material specifically
addressing her nomination experience in The Tyranny of the Majority:
Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy.59 This book is a
consolation-prize rebuttal to the arguments made against her nomina-
tion. The media's pivotal collaboration in the Guinier smear cam-
paign is then explored and criticized.
Part IV explores both the political and academic fallout endured
by the Clinton Administration after withdrawing Guinier's name. The
"'dumbing down of American politics,' "60 exemplified by Guinier's
silencing and the desecration of her respected legal scholarship, is dis-
cussed. The threatened relationship between legal scholarship and
public service is exposed. The Senate's reaction to, and grasp of, uto-
pian versus traditional scholarship is highlighted. Despite Boalt Hall
law professor Robert Post's fascinating and helpful analysis on the im-
pact that choice of scholarship style had on the Senate's treatment of
57. Getting "Guiniered" is more unfair than getting "borked." Opponents of nomi-
nees in both situations launch vehemently aggressive campaigns attacking the nominee's
beliefs as dangerous to democracy as soon as the nomination is announced. Nominees are
borked when they have the opportunity to respond to such concerns at their Senate confir-
mation hearings, but are nonetheless unsuccessful because they fail to persuade the Senate
that confirmation is wise.
Nominees are "Guiniered" when they are denied a Senate confirmation hearing and
any opportunity to respond to criticism; instead, such candidates are dumped by the Presi-
dent solely because of other people's characterizations of them. I thank law review mem-
ber Mark Wiesenthal for coining the term "Guiniered" to describe this distinction.
58. The Wall Street Journal coined the phrase "quota queen" one day after Guinier's
nomination. See Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12.
59. TYRANNY OF =H MAjozrrY, supra note 9.
60. David Von Drehle, Lani, We Hardly Knew Ye: The Lawyer Who Burned Briefly
but Too Brightly for Her Own Good, WASH. PosT, June 4, 1993, at Cl (quoting Randall
Kennedy, Harvard University professor of law).
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Guinier,61 this Comment disputes his conclusion that she might have
fared better by writing in one style rather than another. The choice of
scholarship style will not thaw the chill currently felt in the academic
world.
As a small denouement to Part IV, the ironic acceptance by a
federal court of one of Guinier's most "controversial" voting restruc-
turing proposals, days before her replacement was sworn in, is also
noted.62 The court's holding illustrates the degree of distortion suc-
cessfully perpetrated by the press and conservatives characterizing
Guinier's work as being "out of the mainstream. ' 63
Part V then explores the consequences of silencing Guinier by
first examining the differential treatment controversial predecessors
and successors received. This Comment highlights the tumultuous
and contemporaneous confirmation processes of Webbster Hubbell,
the nominee for Associate Attorney General, and Roberta
Achtenberg, the nominee for Assistant Secretary for Housing and Ur-
ban Development. The obvious analogy to Judge Robert Bork's ex-
periences is discussed, both during his successful confirmation as
Solicitor General and his doomed candidacy for the United States
Supreme Court. Senator Biden's self-serving compromise offer to
Guinier is analyzed, as well as his hypocritical use of political office to
further his version of the Constitution when confirming candidates to
the United States Supreme Court. The remarks of Senator Biden on
the scholarship issue are revealing and should disturb academics and
anyone else interested in protecting the free flow of ideas in literature.
They provide an additional illustration of why the current reform
movement must encompass not only the judicial confirmation process,
but also the executive one.
To identify an effective procedure, however, we must return to
the most fundamental problem with the appointment process: the
lack of focus on a nominee's qualifications. 64 The Senate has moved
so far away from a focus on job qualifications that they appear to be
almost irrelevant. A brief look is taken at what Yale law professor
61. Robert Post, Lani Guinier, Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship, 11
CONST. COMMENTARY 185 (1994).
62. Deval Patrick, who lacked a paper trail, was ultimately confirmed as Assistant At-
torney General for the civil rights division and was a former colleague of Guinier's at the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF). See infra part IV.E.
63. See, ag., Frank J. Murray & Nancy E. Roman, Guinier Fights As She Falls; Clinton:
Choice "Has No Future", WASH. Tumms, June 3, 1993, at Al.
64. See CARTgR, supra note 7, at 9, 159.
1147April 1995]
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Stephen L. Carter calls the "original misunderstanding"65 regarding
the Advice and Consent Clause to emphasize the proper level of Sen-
ate inquiry into good old-fashioned qualifications.
Part VI concludes that Guinier was the right person for the job
but was unjustly silenced for no other reason than to facilitate the
President's own political survival. To prevent these unfortunate cir-
cumstances from repeating themselves, this Comment proposes an
easily implemented procedure for confirming executive nominees to
Article II, Section 2 positions. This procedure's effectiveness in ensur-
ing outstanding candidates, and the country, a fair shot at service is
illustrated by placing-it in the context of two potential "cures" avail-
able for nominees who, like Guinier, suffer a loss of public respect due
to the erroneous distortion of their views. Professor Carter posits
these cures in his book analyzing the Guinier nomination, The Confir-
mation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments Process.
66
Although this Author disagrees with Professor Carter over the fre-
quency with which such cures could, or should, be relied upon, the
proposed procedure makes the cures more easily available should the
president or the Senate choose to avail themselves of their existence.
Finally, the procedure's probable effect on both the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches' actions, both before and after a formal announce-
ment is made, and its effect on the press's future coverage of
nominations, is explored through hypothetical scenarios using the
Guinier nomination as a backdrop..
II. Tim STREss: Ti POLITICAL SCENE AT THE TME OF
LANI GUINIER'S NOMINATION
While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no adminis-
tration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seri-
ously injure the government in the short space of four years.67
President Clinton's 100th day in office 68 coincided with his nomi-
nation of Lani Guinier on April 29, 1993. The reviews were not
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. at 168-69.
67. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LrNcotN:
His SPEECHES AND WRITINGs 579, 588 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
68. See, e.g., Ann Devroy & Ruth Marcus, President Clinton's First 100 Days; Ambi-
tious Agenda and Interruptions Frustrate Efforts to Maintain Focus, WASH. POST, Apr. 29,
1993, at Al.
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kind.69 Clinton endured tremendous criticism immediately before the
Guinier nomination and the days after the announcement provided no
relief. 70 His own budget director, Leon Panetta,71 publicly criticized
Clinton, to the Administration's acute embarrassment, by intimating
that, "virtually everything President Clinton has touched has turned to
mud."72 The gays-in-the-military issue, among others, sparked criti-
cism from both Republicans and Democrats.73 Clinton's party feared
the President was moving farther left from the centrist position he
campaigned on and was not really the "New Democrat" he claimed to
be.74
In addition, the White House was in disarray, partially because so
many members of Clinton's staff were young and inexperienced in the
ways of presidential politics.75 The green staff was christened with the
acronym "TWACS," which stands for "Twentysomethings with a
69. For an excellent source quoting the best stories from the national press, see The
Clinton Administration-First Hundred Days: 100 Down, 1,360 to Go for Clinton, AM.
POL. NETWoRK, Apr. 29,1993, available in WL, APN-HO database; The Clinton Adminis-
tration-First Hundred Days: Beat Writers and Analyzers, AM. POL. NETWORK, supra; The
Clinton Administration-First Hundred Days: Voices of Dissent, AM. POL. NETWORK,
supra.
70. The derision directed at President Clinton was fever pitched in the days before he
withdrew Lani Guinier's nomination to help staunch the flow of criticism. The Chicago
Tribune summed up Clinton's "crimes" with the following cartoon five days before the
withdrawal:
(To the tune of the "Beverly Hillary-Billies"):
Come and listen to my story 'bout a man named Bill
Poor President, barely kept his critics still.
Then one day he was lookin' what to do
When in through the door come a bumblin' crew.
Staff, that is... AMATOORS (kids really).
Well once ol' Bill used to be'a moderate.
Friends of Bill said, "move away from that."
They said, "California is the space you wanna be."
So he loaded up the truck and moved to Beverly.
Hills, that is ... movie stars ... slick haircuts.
The Clinton Administration-White House Shuffle, AM. Poi- NETWORK, June 1, 1993,
available in WL, APN-HO database (quoting May 29, 1993, Chicago Tribune cartoon by
MacNelly).
71. Leon Panetta currently serves as White House Chief of Staff.
72. John McCaslin, Nation; Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1993, at A6.
73. See Melissa Healy, Gays-in-Military Agreement Near, President Says, L.A. TIMES,
May 28, 1993, at Al.
74. See Major Garrett & Ronald A. Taylor, Panetta Quote Bares Split in Clinton Ranks;
Hill Democrats Cheer Candor, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1993, at Al.
75. Susan Page, The Kiddie Corps; Critics Say Youthful Clinton Staff Lacks Savvy, Stat-
ure, NEWSDAY, May 23, 1993, at 5.
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Cause."'7 6 The relentless jokes exacerbated staffer frustration with
"everyone making such a fuss over the fact that they simply exist,' 77 a
complaint made the day Clinton withdrew Guinier's nomination from
Senate consideration.
Clinton was also making enemies with the kind of politicians and
partisan opponents who hold a grudge. During his speech at the an-
nual White House Correspondents Dinner, Clinton joked that the
Wall Street Journal had reported that Senate Minority Leader Robert
Dole was seeking $23 million to convert a Wichita senior center into a
boathouse while opposing the stimulus package.78 Dole was outraged,
spewing that there was "'no truth coming from a White House staff
that is ill-serving the President with these sophomoric attacks.... If
the White House wants to play hardball, I'm ready to suit up.' ,79
George Stephanopoulos, White House Communications Director,
quickly issued a statement assuring that "'[t]he President regrets the
misunderstanding that may have been caused by any hyperbole in his
jokes at Saturday's White House dinner.' "80 Clinton also directed a
little Rush Limbaugh-style humor at the radio and television talk
show host by joking that Limbaugh had praised Attorney General Ja-
net Reno for standing up to U.S. Representative John Conyers during
a House hearing, but "only did [so] because she was attacked by a
black guy."8' Limbaugh responded, "'It's not funny.' "I
The Washington Post dished out a little free advice to the White
House following these political errors: "Until Washington loosens up,
the White House will simply have to be on guard. Jokes must be
screened with the same care given to sub-Cabinet appointees."
8 3
76. TV Monitor, AM. Poi- NETwoRx, June 3, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO
database (quoting reporter Ira Glass on Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, June 3,
1993)).
77. Id.
78. William J. Eaton, Dole Ties White House to "$23-Million Lie", L.A. TiMEs, May 4,
1993, at A12.
79. Id. (quoting Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole).
80. Id. (quoting George Stephanopoulos).
81. Leslie Phillips, Limbaugh: Clinton Joke Low Blow, USA TODAY, May 4, 1993, at
IA.
82. Id. (quoting Rush Limbaugh).
83. Joel Achenbach, A Gaffe a Minute; Suddenly Humor Is No Laughing Matter,
WASH. PosT, May 5, 1993, at BI.
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I. TiH PRESS: "QUOTA" OR CONSENSUS "QUEEN"?
A. The Announcement
On April 29, 1993, President Clinton nominated Lani Guinier to
the position of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the De-
partment of Justice.8 A successful elevation to the job would have
been a coming home for Guinier, who served from 1977-1981 as Spe-
cial Assistant to Assistant Attorney General Drew Days I in the
same Justice Department division.85 Her record as a litigator during
her tenure at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund from 1981-1988 was
widely respected.86 In seven years, she only lost two cases.87 In 1988
she decided to tackle the world of academia and accepted a teaching
position at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law.s8
She appeared to be eminently qualified to serve in the Justice
Department and was the" 'consensus' choice of civil rights groups."89
But the press's obsession with her law review articles preempted any
reporting or analysis of these qualifications. New York University law
professor Derrick Bell would later note the irony by commenting that
"the most common complaint about affirmative action is the difficulty
of finding 'qualified' blacks, but in this case 'you can't imagine any-
body being more qualified than Lani Guinier... and, suddenly, quali-
fications mean nothing.' "0
B. Christening the "Quota Queen"
[W~riters are always selling somebody out.91
Despite the fact that Guinier has rejected the use of quotas in
voting rights processes,92 Clint Bolick9 3 was the first to smear Guinier.
84. Michael Isikoff, Clinton Nominates 7 to Justice; Housekeeper Issue Raised, WASH.
Pos-r, Apr. 30, 1993, at A20.
85. Von Drehle, supra note 60, at C1. Drew Days III currently serves as Solicitor Gen-
eral in the Justice Department.
86. TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRIY, supra note 9, at 189.
87. Id.
88. Von Drehle, supra note 60, at C1.
89. Ruth Marcus, Clinton Withdraws Nomination of Guinier; Legal Writings Contro-
versy Dooms Choice, WASH. PosT, June 4, 1993, at Al.
90. Laurel Leff, From Legal Scholar to Quota Queen, COLuM. JOUnxALisM REv.,
SeptJOct. 1993, at 36, 41 (quoting New York University law professor Derrick Bell).
91. JOAN DIDION, SLOUCHNG TOWARDS BEmmEM at xvi (1968).
92. TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRITY, supra note 9, at 19.
93. Bolick is vice president of the conservative Institute for Justice. Nancy E. Roman,
Clinton's Court List Leans to Moderates; President Seen Trying to Avoid Fight, WASH.
T MEs, May 21, 1993, at Al.
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In a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece headlined "Clinton's Quota
Queens," 94 Bolick characterized Guinier as an extreme left-wing ac-
tivist.95 In addition to other errors, he attributed to Guinier state-
ments made by others. He claimed, for example, that she "decries
'fundamental flaws in our democracy,' urging that 'certain social
goods-health care, day care, job training, housing-must be recog-
nized as basic entitlements.' "96 What she actually wrote was a recom-
mendation to President Bush suggesting he "endorse and coordinate
support for those legislative initiatives which address fundamental
flaws in our democracy." As examples, she cited legislation relating
to voting rights,98 such as the Universal Voter Registration Act,99 an
ultimately unsuccessful measure that had been introduced earlier that
year in the Senate, and section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.100
It was another author, cited in one of Guinier's footnotes, who
thought the country's political agenda should include the "basic enti-
tlements" that Bolick listed. 10'
The conservative Bolick had never read any of Guinier's writings
before he received a call from Abigail Thernstrom, a fellow conserva-
tive and a political science professor at Boston University "with whom
Guinier has had an extended, antagonistic debate' ' 1°2 in academic
journals and treatises.0 She tipped Bolick off about Guinier's liberal
perspectives. 0 4 Once he did read the articles, Bolick may have taken
94. See supra note 58, at A12. The other "queen" referred to was Norma Cantu, the
candidate for Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights in the Department of Education. Id.
Bolick denies any responsibility for the "Quota Queen" headline. Stephen L. Carter, Fore-
word to TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRrry, supra note 9, at xix.
95. Bolick, supra note 58, at A12.
96. Leff, supra note 90, at 40 (quoting Bolick, supra note 58, at A12).
97. Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393,433 (1989), reprinted in TYRANNY OF TE MAJORITY, supra note 9,
at 39.
98. Guinier, supra note 97, at 433.
99. Equal Access to Voting Act, S. 675, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
101. See Guinier, supra note 97, at 433 n.174 (citing Charles V. Hamilton, Foreword to
THE NEW BLACK POLITICS at xix-xx (Michael B. Preston et al. eds., 1982)). This footnote
does not appear in the article as updated in Guinier's book. Guinier may have omitted this
reference either to clarify that her recommendation addressed only voting rights, not social
welfare entitlements, or because her view on the relevancy of the footnote had changed
over time.
102. Leff, supra note 90, at 41.
103. See, eg., TYRANNY OF TIE MAJORrrY, supra note 9, at 57, 211 n.53, 217 n.97 (citing
ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINOR-
rry VOTING RIGHTS (1987)); Abigail Themstrom, Guinier Miss, NEW REPUBLIC, June 14,
1993, at 16.
104. Left, supra note 90, at 41.
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a little personally Guinier's criticism of the Reagan Administration's
record on civil rights law enforcement-and her consequent recom-
mendations to the Bush Administration. 10 5 As a former official in the
Justice Department during Reagan's tenure,0 6 he shared responsibil-
ity for enforcing such laws.
Not content to distort Guinier's beliefs in print, Bolick hit the
airwaves and proclaimed: "'Lani Guinier's writings are profoundly
anti-democratic .... [T]hey amount to a racial apartheid system.' "107
He also appeared on television programs such as The MacNeil/Lehrer
NewsHour10 8 and Crossfire.10 9 By doing so, Bolick reached an even
larger audience while successfully keeping the scrutiny intense and
skewed. After President Clinton withdrew Guinier's name, one
respected journalist concluded, "'The Wall Street Journal and Clint
Bolick really went after her and managed to kill off this
nomination.' "110
The smear campaign escalated. Columnist Paul Gigot, in an arti-
cle that appeared in the Wall Street Journal on May 7, 1993,111 fed on a
single footnote Guinier wrote in an article published in the Michigan
Law Review.11 2 Guinier's article critiqued the wisdom of compla-
cently accepting the theory of "black electoral success" as the "ulti-
mate empowerment goal of structural reform legislation and
litigation. 1 13 One reason is that an implicit assumption in the the-
ory-that all elected black representatives are "authentic" 1 4-is not
true. The Voting Rights Act provides that minorities must be afforded
an equal opportunity "'to elect representatives of their choice.' "115
105. The fact that Guinier addressed her proposals to an audience that included the
Bush Administration prompted Laurel Leff to remark: "What kind of 'radical extremist,'
by the way, offers recommendations to the Bush administration?" Id. at 40.
106. Clint Bolick, The Legal Philosophy That Produced Lani Guinier, WALL ST. J., June
2, 1993, at A15; Leff, supra note 90, at 40.
107. Carter, supra note 94, at ix (quoting Bolick on Morning Edition (NPR radio
broadcast)).
108. See Leff, supra note 90, at 38.
109. The Clinton Administration-Lani Guinier: Left Twisting in the Wind, AM. POL.
NErwoRK, June 3, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database [hereinafter Guinier Left
Tvisting] (quoting Bolick as saying "Lani Guinier is the flip-side of David Duke" on Cross-
fire (CNN television broadcast, June 2, 1993)).
110. Left, supra note 90, at 37 (quoting Los Angeles Times reporter David G. Savage).
111. Paul Gigot, Hillary's Choice on Civil Rights: Back to the Future, WALL ST. J., May
7, 1993, at A14.
112. Guinier, supra note 25, reprinted in TYRANNY oF Tm MjoRrry, supra note 9, at
41.
113. Id. at 54.
114. Id. at 55.
115. Id. at 12.
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For Guinier, the question is: "Which candidates are the representa-
tives of choice of black or Latino voters?
1" 6
Guinier identifies "two related but competing views""17 observers
rely on to answer the question. Guinier's preferred view focuses on
voting behavior: Authentic representatives are "simply those truly
chosen by the people.""' 8 This means that "white candidates can le-
gitimately represent nonwhite voters if those voters elected them."
119
Similarly, black representatives are politically authentic when they are
elected by "majority-black, single-member districts,"'12 as opposed to
"officials who are handpicked by the 'establishment,' or who must ap-
peal to white voters in order to get elected.' 12 ' The former are also
psychologically and culturally authentic because they are "descrip-
tively similar to their constituents.""
The second view of authenticity assumes that elected officials
who simply "look like" their constituents necessarily represent those
constituents' interests."z But Guinier notes that "[j]ust because a
candidate is black does not mean that he or she is the candidate of
choice of the black community." 4 This is because black representa-
tives elected in majority-white jurisdictions may not have enough
power to respond to their black constituents.'2 For example, assume
that a black candidate is elected primarily by white voters, but a signif-
icant amount of voter support also comes from black voters. The fact
that white voters constitute the majority of support may obscure the
"message" black voters sent regarding the "substantive policies"'126
that caused them to vote for the black representative in the first place.
Thus, the reasons a black candidate is elected are obscured from the
representative's view. 27 Guinier concludes that "even where black
116. Id. at 12-13.
117. Id. at 13.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 56.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 58.
126. Id.
127. Id. Guinier notes that even if a majority of the electorate has sent a clear message,
"the representative may have difficulty translating this message into substantive policy,"
because she (1) cannot "persuade her legislative colleagues"; (2) "feel[s] obliged to support
initiatives opposed by those who elected her"; (3) is "pressure[d by] constituent groups";
or (4) her "incumbency... so insulate[s] her from electoral pressures that she feels little
need to respond to constituent demands." Id. at 219 n.108.
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support provides a critical margin, successful black candidates in ma-
jority-white electorates may not necessarily feel obligated to black
voters." 28
The footnote which Gigot focused on characterized Virginia Gov-
ernor Douglas Wilder'29 as a representative who faces this limitation:
"[G]iven the narrow margin of victory, Wilder's ability to govern on
other issues important to the black community is considerably viti-
ated." 30 This was not the first time Wilder's connection to his black
"constituency" was analyzed and doubted in the literature. Just two
footnotes up, Guinier quoted a National Journal article theorizing that
Wilder might" 'become less accessible and less accountable politically
to blacks whose demands will be competing for attention against those
of Virginia's white-majority constituency-and those of Wilder's large
campaign contributors.' ",'31 Even Wilder himself feels he is "'a gov-
ernor who happens to be black, not a black who happens to be
governor.' "132
Because of the limitations the electoral system can inadvertently
impose upon black representatives, Guinier cautions that while "au-
thentic black representation is [not] meaningless," it "is a limited em-
powerment tool.' 33  Some members of the press, however,
transformed this exploration of the authenticity assumption into the
charge that "Guinier called Doug Wilder an Uncle Tom."'13 The fact
that other commentators shared her perspective, which was well rep-
resented in the literature on the subject,'13 and that Wilder's own
comments validated her concerns, was apparently irrelevant to people
like Gigot.
128. ld. at 58 (footnote omitted).
129. Douglas Wilder, elected in 1989, is Virginia's first black governor. B. Drummond
Ayres, Jr., Wilder's Flier, N.Y. TiME=s, Jan. 12, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 31, 32.
130. Guinier, supra note 25, reprinted in TYRANNY OF THE MAJOR=Y, supra note 9, at
219 n.110.
131. Id. at 219 n.108 (quoting James A. Barnes, Into the Mainstreai, NAT'L J., Feb. 3,
1990, at 262, 265 (1990) (interviewing Howard University professor Ron Walters)).
132. Id. at 219 n.110 (quoting B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Virginia Governor Baffles Dem-
ocrats with Crusade for "New Mainstream", N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1990, at A22).
133. Id. at 58.
134. Leff, supra note 90, at 40. For additional articles distorting Guinier's authenticity
theory, see Thernstrom, supra note 103, at 16; George F. Will, Sympathy for Guinier,
NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1993, at 78.
135. See TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrrY, supra note 9, at 222 n.125 (citing JOiN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRST 135 (1980)); Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution,
in MINORITY VOTE DILUION 1, 5-10 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
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C. The Rest: Misquoting the Alleged Quota Queen
And the betrayers of language
•.. and the press gang
And those who had lied for hire;
the perverts, the perverters of language,
the perverts, who have set money-lust
Before the pleasure of the senses;
howling, as of a hen-yard in a printing house,
the clatter of presses,
the blowing of dry dust and stray paper,
foetor, sweat, the stench of stale oranges .... 36
The politically loaded quota queen label was too catchy for other
publishers to resist, and soon it appeared in the Los Angeles Times,
Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report, just to name a few. 137
Professor Stephen L. Carter later called the press "lazy or incompe-
tent"'31 for carrying out the conservative smear campaign begun by
the Wall Street Journal and continued by Stuart Taylor. Taylor, a col-
umnist for the American Lawyer, was one of the few people who actu-
ally read Guinier's articles. 139 Unfortunately for the public, Taylor
chose to distort her work, rather than accurately report it.
40
Newsweek's first article on the Guinier nomination boasted the
title, "Crowning a 'Quota Queen'?' 4 ' The author justified his aping
of the phrase by noting "'it wasn't in Newsweek's voice' 142 but
rather, "'around town.' "143 Also "around town" and reprinted with-
out independent research and analysis were specific law review
passages quoted by Clint Bolick and others.'"
Why did these media powerhouses indulge in such tabloid jour-
nalism techniques? The Washington Post's Michael Isikoff offered the
excuse that he was covering the controversy, not the articles, even
136. EzRA PouNrD, Ti CANrros (1-95) XIV, at 61-62 (1956).
137. Leff, supra note 90, at 38.
138. Carter, supra note 94, at x.
139. Left, supra note 90, at 40 (citing New York Times reporter David Margolick). Stu-
art Taylor himself attests to "receiv[ing] several frantic calls from reporters asking for a
quickie summary of Guinier's views." Id
140. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., DOJ Nominee's "Authentic" Black Views, LEGAL TIMEs,
May 17, 1993, at 23 (erroneously arguing that Guinier proposes guaranteed seats and quo-
tas to achieve proportional representation).
141. See Bob Cohn, Crowning a "Quota Queen"?, NEWSWTE, May 24, 1993, at 67, 67.
142. Left, supra note 90, at 38 (quoting Newsweek reporter Bob Cohn).
143. Id (quoting Newsweek reporter Bob Cohn).
144. Id
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though he later admitted he did not provide balanced coverage of
Guinier's views on the Voting Rights Act.145 David G. Savage, a re-
porter for the Los Angeles Times, revealed his colleagues' reactions to
the Guinier quotes at that time as "'we know this is about
quotas.' "146
The knee-jerk jump to characterizing Guinier, a black woman, as
a proponent of a reverse discrimination quota system was, in Savage's
opinion, " 'an attempt to fit Guinier into a preconceived view of what
counts in debates about race.' "147 Georgetown law professor Mari
Matsuda compared "the deeply racist and misogynist underpinnings
of the pejorative label 'quota queen'" with "its linguistic predecessor,
'welfare queen.' "148 Both "evoke[ ] cultural stereotypes with the spe-
cific intent of substituting kneejerk prejudice for critical thought."'149
The Senate, Matsuda posits, was afraid to question Guinier lest the
ghost of Anita Hill return to haunt them, and so some pressured Clin-
ton to drop her-"as though the lesson learned from their abysmal
failure in the Clarence Thomas hearings was never to deal publicly
with black women again."'150 The result is that "an African-American
woman is a political hot potato [Capitol Hill] won't touch."'' Univer-
sity of Southern California law professor Erwin Chemerinsky echoed
this sentiment by speculating, "'If she wasn't a black woman I'm not
sure it would have come out that way.' "152 Dean Geoffrey Stone of
the University of Chicago was less generous in his appraisal, calling
the media coverage a "'cartoon.' 153
The press coverage would have better served the public's inter-
ests by focusing on Guinier's qualifications and background. But only
The Washington Post published a detailed resume of her career as a
litigator-after her nomination was withdrawn.'5 4  Independent re-
search on the subject matter of her writings, the Voting Rights Act of
1965,111 and her goal, effectuating more effective minority representa-
tion under it, would have unearthed a key fact: Guinier's proposals
145. Id (quoting Washington Post reporter Michael Isikoff).
146. Id- at 39 (quoting Los Angeles 7mes reporter David G. Savage).
147. Id (quoting Los Angeles Tunes reporter David G. Savage).
148. Mai Matsuda, The Baiting of Lani Guinier, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 7, 1993, at 9.
149. Id
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Leff, supra note 90, at 39 (quoting University of Southern California Law Center
professor Erwin Chemerinsky).
153. Id. at 38 (quoting University of Chicago Law School Dean Geoffrey Stone).
154. See Von Drehle, supra note 60, at C1.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
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were already the law. For example, one of her key proposals, cumula-
tive voting, 56 was approved by both the Bush and Reagan Adminis-
trations pursuant to the Voting Rights Act "to protect the rights of
racial- and language-minority voters.' 57 The Reagan Administration
likewise approved supermajority rules as a remedy in places like Mo-
bile, Alabama. 58 Guinier's proposals thus reflected her deep commit-
ment to enforcing, not undermining, the nation's civil rights
statutes. 59
Rather than reporting these facts, U.S. News and World Report
ran a story in which the reporter cribbed portraits of Guinier drawn
by other journalists and then concluded:
These are very strange views for a civil-rights chief to
have.... [I]t is safe to say that the Justice Department's divi-
sion has not yet come under the sway of anyone who wants
to toss out America's electoral system, replace it with race-
based proportional representation and then, perhaps, settle
down to splinter-group politics in which each tribe has its
own political party.
60
To prevent the derailment of the next nominee with a paper trail
who happens to "catch[ ] the eye of an activist opponent"'161 in the
press, freelance journalist Laurel Leff offers a simple solution. First,
reporters should decide whether the nominee's philosophical views
will impact their performance in the job.' 62 Second, reporters need to
do their own homework rather than rely on their colleagues. This
means they should read the articles in their entirety to determine their
content, with the help of scholars if necessary. 63 Third, reporters
must then present a balanced portrait of the nominee's views, not just
156. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
157. TYRNY oF Tm MAjorvy, supra note 9, at 15. In addition, since 1969 the Jus-
tice Department, under various presidents, has rejected as discriminatory over 100 sets of
voting rules changes submitted by states. Id. at 9. Justice Clarence Thomas agrees with
Guinier as well. See Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581,2601-02 (1994) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ.,
concurring) (citing Guinier approvingly and asserting that "cumulative voting and other
non-district-based methods of effecting proportional representation are simply more effi-
cient and straightforward mechanisms for achieving what has already become our tacit
objective: roughly proportional allocation of political power according to race.").
158. TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrrY, supra note 9, at 17.
159. CARTER, supra note 7, at 42, 52.
160. John Leo, A Controversial Choice at Justice, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 17,
1993, at 19, 19.
161. Left, supra note 90, at 41.
162. Id.
163. Id
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the controversial aspects.'6 Finally, reporters must resist the impulse
to perpetuate "code words, 165 like the quota queen label, so they can
"facilitate a real discussion about race"' 66 or other topics of high-in-
tensity national interest. This Author's proposal, outlined below, 67
will most fully accomplish its purpose-filling executive branch posi-
tions with qualified, dedicated people, with or without paper trails in
tow-when the press adheres to these simple guidelines.
IV. Ti TEST
I hear many condemn these men because they were so few.
When were the good and the brave ever in a majority?6 '
A. The Eleventh Hour Shutout
President Clinton ineffectively tried to assuage doubts that
Guinier would not use the position as a vehicle to dismantle "one per-
son-one vote" principles by stating: "'I think she has every intention
of following the law of the land as Congress writes it.' ",169 But prior
accusations from both Republicans and Democrats-that Clinton was
not the "New Democrat" he said he was during his campaign 70-re-
surfaced now with regard to the Guinier nomination. One Demo-
cratic consultant opined, "'[Clinton's] moderate positions on cultural
issues [were] a large reason why he was elected. When he [said] the
words "new Democrat" that's what people heard. But his actions
have run counter to the rhetoric of [his] campaign on these cultural
issues.' ,171 An op-ed piece first mangled Guinier's minority veto al-
ternative by asserting "Guinier wants her caucus of 'authentic blacks'
to have the right to kill any bill it doesn't like,' 1 72 and then concluded
that "Guinier's nomination goes well beyond Clinton misrepresenting
164. Id
165. I&
166. Id-
167. See infra part VI.
168. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, A Plea for Captain John Brown, in GREAT SHORT
WoRKs oF HENRY DAn THOREAU 270, 287 (Wendell Glick ed., 1982) (1859).
169. Excerpts from Clinton's News Conference in the Rose Garden, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1993, at A8 (quoting President Clinton).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
171. Ronald Brownstein, Nomination May Add Race Issue to Democrats' Schism, L.A.
TiMs, May 26, 1993, at Al, A21 (quoting Democratic consultant Brian Lunde).
172. The Clinton Administration-Job Board-- Black Leaders Question Hubbell's Sincer-
ity, AM. POL. NETWoRK, May 11, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database (quoting May
10, 1993, N.Y. Post editorial).
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himself during the national campaign by pretending to oppose racial
quotas in order to win over the mainstream Democrats."'
1 73
Newspaper reporters also noted Senate Minority Leader Robert
Dole's apparent "payback" mentality by extensively quoting his
promise that Guinier's paper trail would be closely scrutinized "'just
as Robert Bork had a paper trail that finally did him in because of the
Democrats' opposition.' "174 Senate Judiciary Committee member
Orrin Hatch echoed the warning, promising that Guinier would not
enjoy the "'mild treatment' "175 that Webbster Hubbell had received
during his recently concluded confirmation hearings for Associate At-
torney General. 76 But Newsweek theorized that any payback strat-
egy could backfire because a Republican attack on another black
woman would stir "the ghost of Anita Hill."'
1 7 7
Several weeks later the White House finally began "considering
tactics to blunt the growing criticism in Congress.' 7 8 One option was
a Clinton-Guinier appearance "in some public forum in which [the
President] would emphasize his support and make it clear that she
would operate under the control" of himself and Attorney General
Janet Reno. 7 9 This was an approach Clinton had used before. 80 In-
stead, on May 27 White House Congressional Liaison Howard Paster
issued a letter to all senators urging that Guinier had been a victim of
an "'unfair and extreme attack,' "181 openly fretting that "'[w]e rec-
ognize that it is sometimes difficult to turn people away from big lies
that gather momentum.' ",182 Still, the letter was meant to address the
"'substantial misinformation' "183 about her views that had been per-
173. Id.
174. The Clinton Administration-Names and Faces: Guinier Hearings to Be Full of
"Fireworks", AM. POL. NETWORx, May 17, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database
(quoting Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole).
175. The Clinton Administration-Hubbel" Not Caught in Any Webb; "Breezes"
Through, AM. Poi- NETwoRK, May 20, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database [herein-
after Hubbelk Not Caught in Any Webb] (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch).
176. Id.; see infra notes 323-34.
177. Cohn, supra note 141, at 67 (citing unidentified Senate source).
178. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Faces Battle over a Civil Rights Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 1993, at B9.
179. Id. During this time, Benjamin Chavis, executive director of the NAACP, sought,
and was given, assurances by Clinton that the" 'nomination [was] solid.'" Murray & Ro-
man, supra note 63, at Al (quoting Benjamin Chavis).
180. See infra text accompanying note 326.
181. John M. Broder, White House Seeks to Save Rights Nominee, L.A. TIMES, May 27,
1993, at A18 (quoting White House Congressional Liaison Howard Paster).
182. Id. (quoting White House Congressional Liaison Howard Paster).
183. Id. (quoting White House Congressional Liaison Howard Paster).
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petrated and "dispel rumors that the White House was considering
withdrawing the nomination in the face of attacks from conservative
legal groups and questions from some Senate moderates about her
ideas on quotas, voting rights and racial preferences."'184
The Washington Times simultaneously reported that no date had
yet been set for the hearings, but that sources said White House strat-
egy included "tim[ing] its long-awaited nomination of a new Supreme
Court justice with the Guinier hearings in an effort to divert attention
away from her."'"5 In an effort to keep the nomination alive, support-
ers belatedly began voicing their support. 86 Ralph G. Neas, executive
director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, tried to steer
the focus back onto Guinier's record: "'Throughout the country, she
is acknowledged as one of the finest and most successful civil rights
litigators.' "187 Even some of her detractors, like the American Jewish
Congress, called only for "'careful scrutiny' ""8 rather than prema-
ture withdrawal before the still-uischeduled Senate hearing. It
seemed Guinier's fate would "come down to her performance at her
confirmation hearing, in June or July,"' 89 after all.
184. Id.
185. Jerry Seper, Guinier Backers, Foes Speak Out; Some Find Her Rights Stance Ex-
treme, WASH. TnmsS, May 27, 1993, at Al.
186. Supporters included: Wade Henderson, Director of the NAACP's Washington of-
fice; Elaine Jones, NAACP Legal Defense Fund; Mario Moreno, Mexican-American Legal
Defense and Education Fund; and Richard Womack, AFL-CIO. Id. In addition, only five
of the 185 groups in the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights opposed Guinier's nomina-
tion. See Correction, WAsH. TIMEs, May 28, 1993 (final edition).
187. Carolyn Skorneck, Guinier Gets Support of Coalition: Calling Attacks on Her Un-
fair, the White House Said It Would Press On, PHILA. INQUMER, May 27, 1993, at A13
(quoting Ralph G. Neas).
188. Seper, supra note 185, at Al (quoting American Jewish Congress President Robert
K. Lifton).
189. Lewis, supra note 178, at B9. One natural question is why Guinier's hearing date
was still not set at this point. See Seper, supra note 185, at Al. After all, other nominees
battling attacks just as contentious had their hearings scheduled quickly and were allowed
to testify. See infra notes 314-31 and accompanying text. What difference can testifying
make to a controversial nomination naysayers predict is doomed? The best recent exam-
ple is undoubtedly Justice Clarence Thomas. See infra notes 434-38 and accompanying
text. In the executive office context, Webbster Hubbell, who went through the nomination
process for the position of Associate Attorney General at approximately the same time as
Guinier, won "top reviews" from the committee after he testified. Jerry Seper, Confirma-
tion of Top 3 at Justice Seems Assured, WASH. TnWs, May 21, 1993, at A4; see infra notes
323-31 and accompanying text. Before he testified, press reports and senatorial comments
regarding Hubbell's membership in a formally whites-only golf club hid been extremely
critical and ominously negative. See infra part notes 325-31 and accompanying text.
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But a few days later, predictions on Guinier's future turned pessi-
mistic. 9 ' Too much damage had been done. She had become "the
Robert H. Bork of the left"' 91-with a difference: Lani Guinier
would not get a hearing.
B. The Muzzling of Guinier
[I]f I had to choose between betraying my country and be-
traying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my
country. 192
The Clintons and Lani Guinier had been close friends since their
days at Yale Law School.' 93 As with some other friends Bill Clinton
had nominated to Cabinet posts in his first term,194 Guinier's nomina-
tion had sparked controversy. Clinton thus faced a choice he had con-
fronted before: continue to support Guinier's nomination and face a
"bruising fight in the Senate," 95 or turn his back on her and come
"under intense fire from civil rights groups and women's activists who
will accuse him of buckling under pressure."' 96 The press continued
to report that Hillary Rodham Clinton "is believed to be [her] strong-
190. The Wall Street Journal could hardly contain its glee: "As the administration strug-
gles to right itself, an early casualty may be Lani Guinier." Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Michael
K. Frisby, Travel Office Mess, Other Blunders Hurt President on Eve of House Budget Vote,
WALL ST. J., May 26, 1993, at A3. Other predictions were made slightly tongue-in-cheek.
Tim Russert said," 'My guess is you are going to see [Clinton] move dramatically to be the
New Democrat change agent.... My guess is that he will pull back on the nomination of
Lani Guinier .... And if you're a white moderate judge, you probably got a pretty good
chance to be on the Supreme Court this week.'" The Clinton Administration-Job Board;
Lani Too Controversial? How About Dagmar?, AM. POL. NETWORx, May 26, 1993, avail-
able in WL, APN-HO database (quoting NBC News Washington bureau chief Tim Russert
on Today (NBC television broadcast, May 26, 1993)).
191. David G. Savage, Paper Trail Could Block Nominee for Justice Post, L.A. TIMEs,
May 22, 1993, at Al.
192. E.M. FORSTmR, Two CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY 78 (1951).
193. Marcus, supra note 89, at Al. The Clintons also attended Guinier's wedding in
1986 at Martha's Vineyard, id., where the President would return for a vacation shortly
after he withdrew her nomination, Mary Ann French, The Vineyard's Oh-So-Cozy Allure,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 19, 1993, at Cl.
194. See infra notes 323-31 and accompanying text.
195. David Lauter, Aides Say Clinton May Drop Rights Nominee, L.A. TiMEs, June 2,
1993, at Al.
196. Id. at A12. Although perhaps this last possibility would have been welcomed at the
White House, as at least one Clinton adviser reportedly confessed," 'it wouldn't hurt right
about now to have some liberals screaming at Clinton.'" The Clinton Administration-
Guinier: Lani, We Hardly Knew Ye, AM. POL. NnrwonR, June 2, 1993, available in WL,
APN-HO database (quoting news correspondent Jim Miklaszewski on Today (NBC televi-
sion broadcast, June 2, 1993)).
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est supporter,"'197 and that Janet Reno continued to endorse enthusi-
astically her nomination.198 White House aides told reporters a
slightly different story-that "Clinton, noted for his reluctance to
cause pain to others, has not made up his mind to drop [Guinier]." 199
Nevertheless, aides "clearly were sending public messages to Guinier
and her supporters that the nomination had become too hot and that
she should pull out."2 0
Guinier was undeterred. Her supporters had finally organized
and were calling on the press and interest groups to meet and inter-
view her.20 1 In addition, backers "were starting to denounce the
White House for having failed to mount a proper defense of Guinier
in the first place and for suggesting that the nomination be abandoned
before Guinier has had [a] full opportunity to defend herself.
' 202
Some fingers pointed at White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum,
20 3
previously accused of botching the Zoe Baird and Kimba Wood nomi-
nations.2°4 Nussbaum allegedly gave the President the green light to
announce the nomination, despite the fact that some aides sounded a
warning signal about Guinier's work.205  White House infighting
spurred the nomination on. The individuals expressing concern were
former employees of Senate Democrats who feared controversy of
197. Neil A. Lewis, Senate Democrats Urge Withdrawal of Rights Nominee, N.Y. TIMs,
June 2, 1993, at Al.
198. See id.
199. Lauter, supra note 195, at Al.
200. Itt
201. Id. On the Capitol Hill side, Guinier paid courtesy calls to several senators with
some positive results. Lewis, supra note 197, at Al. For example, Senator Patrick J.
Leahy, a member of the Judiciary Committee, met with Guinier and was so "'impressed
with her explanations,'" that his reservations about her evaporated. Id. (quoting Senator
Patrick Leahy). He added that Guinier should be given the opportunity to share her expla-
nations with everyone before a committee hearing. Id.
But it was too late. Some Senate Democrats had already told the White House "that
it must withdraw the Guinier nomination because she was likely to win approval from only
a small minority of the 18 members of the Senate Judiciary Committee." Id. Later, How-
ard Paster as executioner would tell Guinier that "many senators were telling the White
House something they weren't always willing to tell [her] to her face: that they couldn't
vote to confirm her.... But she didn't get the hint." Bimbaum & Davidson, supra note 3,
at A16.
202. Lauter, supra note 195, at Al.
203. Id. at A12. Nussbaum admits he miscalculated the Guinier nomination by "assum-
ing that any difficulties posed by her academic writing would be outweighed by her record
as a civil rights litigator." David Margolick, At the Bar; An All-Star New York Lawyer
Disputes the Idea That He's Become a White House Bumbler, N.Y. TiMES, June 11, 1993, at
A26.
204. Margolick, supra note 203, at A26.
205. Cohn, supra note 2, at 27.
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any kind; therefore, the objectivity of these insiders was doubted.20 6
After Administration lawyers and outside experts read Guinier's
work, Nussbaum told Clinton that his friend "'had written some arti-
cles, but they wouldn't pose a problem.' "207
Ironically, members of the press began pointing fingers at each
other:
In what might be called a conservative answer to "Borking,"
a volley launched by columnist Paul Gigot and conservative
legal scholar Clint Bolick on the editorial page of the Wall
Street Journal has stripped her complex, ponderous writings
of their context and has downright distorted what's left, all to
make [Guinier] sound like a flaming radical who intends to
turn America's voting system on its head.208
Another press member felt Guinier had been "the target of the most
effective smear campaign seen in Washington since Joe McCarthy's
day. ' 20 9 The press, perhaps seeking absolution, also urged Clinton to
give Guinier a chance to speak at a Senate hearing: "Guinier's bad
ideas outweigh the good ones, but so what? They are serious. Why
not give them a hearing? ... It would be an opportunity to debate the
nature of civil rights and what government has done to promote them.
That's a debate to be welcomed, not feared. 21 0
C. The Battle to Be Heard
"I'm trying to play by the rules....
They keep changing them."' 1
Guinier, desperately trying to salvage her nomination, appeared
on Nightline on the eve of her withdrawal,212 despite the White
House's request that she remain silent.213 But instead of discussing
206. Id
207. Id. (quoting unidentified White House aide).
208. Clarence Page, The Smearing of Lani Guinier, CHL TRm., May 30, 1993, at A3.
209. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Anatomy of a Smear, N.Y. TiMEs, June 4, 1993,
at A31.
210. Don't Withdraw Lani Guinier, WASH. TiMEs, June 2, 1993, at G2.
211. Michael Putzel, Rights Pick Withdrawn; Clinton Says He Lacked Data on Guinier,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 1993, at Al (quoting Guinier).
212. Lewis, supra note 4, at Al.
213. Id. One White House official explained, "'She wanted to go on [television]....
The general rule at the White House is that you don't go on television until you are con-
firmed.' '4 Id. (quoting unidentified White House official).
Guinier revealed, after her nomination was withdrawn, that the White House asked
her "'not to speak to the press, not to respond to these criticisms as part of the process.
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her views, Ted Koppel repeatedly asked whether the White House had
pressured her to withdraw.214 She finally replied, "'I, again, am here
to talk about who I am, and I think that's what the American people
would like to hear.' "215 She made her case eloquently, stressing,
"'Judge Bork was given the opportunity to express his views before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. . . . I would like that same
opportunity.' 1216
Unfortunately, some felt "her self-defense came a couple of days
too late. 2 17 Also tardy were public pleas by others asking the Presi-
dent to stick by Guinier. For example, on the day Jesse Jackson as-
sured Guinier supporters that "'[w]e're urging [President Clinton] to
stand tall on an excellent nomination,' ""8 Clinton withdrew her nom-
ination. Likewise, many commentators who believed that withdraw-
ing Guinier's nomination would be a political mistake only spoke out
on the day of the President's announcement.21 9
D. The Trouble with Getting "Guiniered"
1. Political fallout
"She wasn't borked, she was Clintoned."20
That was the administration's policy.'" The Clinton Administration-Clinton and Blacks:
Deep Re-evaluation Time, AM. POL- NETwoRK, June 11, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO
database [hereinafter Deep Re-evaluation Time] (quoting Guinier during interview on
PrimeTime (ABC television broadcast, June 10, 1993)).
214. Murray & Roman, supra note 63, at Al.
215. Guinier Left Twisting, supra note 109 (quoting Guinier on Nightline (ABC televi-
sion broadcast, June 2, 1993)).
216. Id. (quoting Guinier on Nightline (ABC television broadcast, June 2, 1993)).
217. l& (quoting Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast, June 3, 1993)).
218. Lewis, supra note 4, at Al (quoting Jesse Jackson).
219. For example, The Washington Post predicted: "Clinton, were he to abandon this
nomination at this preliminary stage, would appear not as a born-again centrist but as a
president who doesn't know his own mind and runs from trouble." The Guinier Nomina-
tion, WASH. PosT, June 3, 1993, at A24. National Public Radio's Nina'Totenberg warned
of potential backlash: "'If, as now seems likely, the president pulls the plug, he is sending
a signal he'll cave in any time there's pressure, and he's alienating perhaps the most loyal
part of his coalition until now, the civil rights groups.'" Guinier Left Twisting, supra note
109 (quoting Nina Totenberg on Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, June 3, 1993)).
U.S. Civil Rights Commission's Mary Frances Berry raised the character issue: "'If for
some political reasons he decided to back away, then it would raise serious questions about
Bill Clinton's character. What kind of person fails to support his nominee? Can other
people count on Bill Clinton to support them when times get tough?'" David Lauter &
Sam Fulwood III, Clinton to Seek Senate Consultation on Justice Nominee, L.A. TIMEs,
June 3, 1993, at A10 (quoting Mary Frances Berry).
220. Summary: TV Soundbite, Aid. POL. NarwoRK, June 7, 1993, available in WL,
APN-HO database (quoting GOP strategist William Bennett during his appearance on
Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast, June 4, 1993)).
1165April 1995]
1166 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
On June 3, 1993, President Clinton withdrew Lani Guinier's nom-
ination for Assistant Attorney General for the civil fights division."1
Calling the fiasco the "worst day of his presidency,' '11 2 he explained,
"[a]t the time of the nomination, I had not read her writings.
In retrospect, I wish I had.... They clearly lend themselves
to interpretations that do not represent the views that I ex-
pressed on civil rights during my campaign... even though
there is much in them with which I agree. I have to tell you
that had I read them before I nominated her, I would not
have done so.... She has been subject to a vicious series of
willful distortions on many issues, including the quota issue.
And that has made this decision all the more difficult....
And I want all of you to know that if this nomination could
be fought out on her character or her record as a civil rights
lawyer, I would stay with it to the end .... It is not the fear
of defeat that has prompted this decision. It is the certainty
that the battle would be carried on a ground that I could not
defend.
... The problem is that this battle will be waged based
on her academic writings.
' '223
Vice President Albert Gore, appearing on Nightline that evening, de-
nied that the decision was politically motivated in any way.'
But although the Administration could deny that politics played a
part in the decision, it could not deny the adverse political conse-
quences following Clinton's withdrawal announcement. Black polit-
ical groups were infuriated over Clinton's dumping of Guinier. Black
leaders stirred up memories of Sister Souljah and Jesse Jackson's
treatment during the presidential campaign.225 The criticism came
fast and furious: "Any time Captain Marshmallow's political boat
221. Lewis, supra note 209, at A31.
222. Cohn, supra note 2, at 28.
223. Transcript of President Clinton's Announcement, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1993, at A19
(quoting President Clinton).
224. The Clinton Administration-Lani Guinier: It's All Over but the Shouting, AM.
POL. NETWoRK, June 4, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database [hereinafter It's All
Over but the Shouting] (citing Vice President Gore's statement on Nightline (ABC televi-
sion broadcast, June 3, 1993)).
225. Deep Re-evaluation Tune, supra note 213 (citing June 11, 1993, N.Y. Daily News
interview with U.S. Representative Edolphus Towns).
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runs into stormy waters, it looks like he will toss African-American
cargo overboard." 6
One group within the Congressional Black Caucus wanted to
"'make the President crawl and beg for mercy.' ",227 In an article
comparing Guinier with Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown,22 Ron
Walters, chair of Howard University's Political Science Department
and Jesse Jackson advisor, predicted that if Clinton did not "'stick by
Ron Brown, it will be politically untenable for [him].' "9 Congress-
man Craig Washington issued an ominous warning to President Clin-
ton: "'I've been out there for the [P]resident on some things when
I've been asked to do it because I thought it was right. But don't
come looking, and don't come calling, and don't count on my vote
from now on.' "230
NAACP Executive Director Benjamin Chavis focused blame on
the Senate Democrats as well: "'What is the problem?... The prob-
lem is race. It is a litmus test for America. I want to place the blame
where it belongs. I think that the Senate Democrats don't have the
stomach to stand up to those right-wing Republicans.' "231
For many "[t]he specter of Anita Hill loom[ed] large in this pro-
cess, '232 as well. One parallel was the shutout and lack of support
both women suffered on Capitol Hill during their hours of need. Af-
ter Guinier was officially dumped, she finally revealed that Clinton
did not speak to her from the time she was nominated until the White
226. Barbara Reynolds, Guinier's Supporters Could Mutiny on Clinton's Ship, USA To-
DAY, June 11, 1993, at 13A.
227. Sam Fulwood III, Congressional Black Caucus Turns Up Heat on Clinton, L.A.
TMrss, June 11, 1993, at Al, A16 (quoting unidentified source close to Caucus).
228. Ron Brown was then under investigation for allegedly receiving funds from
Vietnamese business executives and other illegal activities. David Johnston, Inquiry on
Commerce Secretary Finds Vietnam Bank Account Plan, N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 2, 1993, at A7.
229. Susan B. Garland, A Dilemma Called Ron Brown, Bus. WK., Oct. 11, 1993, at 32,
32 (quoting Ron Walters).
230. The Clinton Administration-Lani Guinier: Firestorm from Civil Rights, Women's
Groups, AM. POL. NETwoRK, June 4, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database (quoting
Rep. Craig Washington on NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, June 3, 1993)).
231. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Abandons His Nominee for Rights Post Amid Opposition,
N.Y. TImEs, June 4, 1993, at Al (quoting Benjamin Chavis).
232. Michael Putzel, Rights Nominee Digs in As Clinton Backs Off, Justice Dept Choice
Demands a Hearing, BostoN GLOBE, June 3,1993, at Al; see also Ruth Marcus & Michael
Isikoff, Administration Leaves Guinier in Limbo; Clinton May Withdraw Name; Nominee
Presses for Senate Hearing, WASH. PosT, June 3, 1993, at Al (women's groups compare
treatment of Guinier with that of Anita Hill); Marcus, supra note 89, at Al (civil rights
groups compare treatment of Guinier with that of Anita Hill).
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House meeting where he made his decision to withdraw her name.1 3
Even then, he did not extend her the routine formality of first asking
her to withdraw.234 Later asked if she felt betrayed, Guinier stated
with characteristic grace, "'I feel that he made the wrong deci-
sion.' ,,235 As for her grade on Clinton's civil rights agenda, she said,
"'I think that we're still waiting for him to hand in his
homework.' ,236
The Washington Post said the White House "violated one of the
cardinal rules for any big confirmation: define your nominee before
the opposition does it for you."23 7 Guinier agreed: "'I wouldn't vote
for me either if all I knew about me was what I had read in the news-
paper.' "238 Ironically, Judge Bork, who probably got better treatment
from his foes, sympathized with Guinier: "'If it weren't for the suffer-
ing that [she] went through, the thing would be a comedy.' "239
2. The fallout from academia
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.24°
a. the impact of race
As Professor Stephen L. Carter said, "'scholarship is a conversa-
tion.' "241 Scholars try out theories in print partly to "'provoke a re-
233. Deep Re-evaluation Time, supra note 213 (reporting Guinier interview on Prime-
Time (ABC television broadcast, June 10, 1993)). Deputy White House Chief of Staff Roy
Neel admitted that "[t]he President ha[d] not talked to Miss Guinier." Guinier Left 7vist-
ing, supra note 109 (quoting Roy Neel on Today (NBC television broadcast, June 3,
1993)).
234. Deep Re-evaluation Time, supra note 213 (reporting Guinier interview on Prime-
Time (ABC television broadcast, June 10, 1993)).
235. Id. (quoting Guinier during interview on PrimeTime (ABC television broadcast,
June 10, 1993)).
236. National Briefing-Civil Rights: March Speakers Note Clinton's Absence, AM.
POL. NErwoRK, Aug. 30, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database (quoting Guinier dur-
ing her appearance on Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 29, 1993)).
237. Marcus & Isikoff, supra note 232, at Al.
238. Deep Re-evaluation Time, supra note 213 (quoting Guinier during interview on
PrimeTime (ABC television broadcast, June 10, 1993)).
239. The Clinton Administration-The Guinier Nomination: There's an Opening at Jus-
tice, AM. POL. NErwoRK, June 7, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database (quoting Judge
Robert H. Bork on Nightline (ABC television broadcast, June 4, 1993)).
240. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled
by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
241. Leff, supra note 90, at 38 (quoting Yale law professor Stephen L. Carter).
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sponse' "242 from other scholars. But when scholarship involving race
is unnaturally transplanted to the mass media, response may involve
more than counterpoint offered on an intellectual plane. Some schol-
ars believed Guinier's treatment was traceable to her subject-race
discrimination.243 University of Texas law professor Samuel Is-
sacharoff posited: "'Because Guinier spoke of race, of a divided soci-
ety, it was almost as if those things were her fault, that it was improper
to be speaking about this stuff.' "24 As illustrated earlier, the press
perpetuated the quota queen label to such a degree that it paralyzed
any meaningful discussion of the impact of race on .one's ability to
participate politically in our society.
After Guinier's treatment, the more general concern in academia
is that scholars may be "punished for the sin of unconventional think-
ing, 245 by finding the opportunity to serve their'country denied them,
without even being given a chance to explain themselves. The ques-
tion now is whether the same fate that befell Guinier awaits other
daring scholars who, instead, "may hesitate to propose innovative
ideas for fear of being disqualified from ever serving in government,
thus limiting the pool of academics eligible for top government ap-
pointments to the most timid and unoriginal scholars."
'2A6
b. is utopianism to blame?
Boalt Hall law professor Robert Post thinks "that a misfortune
like that which befell Lani Guinier was simply waiting to happen." 7
Post traces Guinier's misfortune to the kind of scholar she is, arguing
that her specific ideas on race merely exacerbated the situation.'
242. Id. (quoting Yale law professor Stephen L. Carter).
243. Id. (interviewing University of Virginia law professor Pamela Karlan). Professor
Karlan believes the Guinier debacle taught academics that, "'It's impossible to write a
100-page article in which someone can't take something out which damages you, especially
when the topic is race.'" ld. (quoting Professor Pamela Karlan); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 146-53.
244. Leff, supra note 90, at 41 (quoting University of Texas law professor Samuel
Issacharoff).
245. See The Destruction of Lani Guinier, Cm. TRm., June 6, 1993, at A2 (editorial).
246. Leff, supra note 90, at 38. The very unfortunate forced withdrawal on January 20,
1995, of R. Samuel Paz's candidacy for a federal court judgeship proves that outstanding
candidates for public service continue to be punished for daring to challenge the status
quo. See R. Samuel Paz, Federal District Court Nomination Process: Smears of Contro-
versy and Ideological Sentinels, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 903 (1995).
247. Post, supra note 61, at 194.
248. See id.
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Guinier is a utopian scholar as opposed to a traditional scholar.249
Traditional scholarship "tends to work within and to tinker at the mar-
gins of existing legal institutions.""25 It defers to the legitimacy of
legal institutions themselves and respects precedent. 2 1 If Guinier was
a traditionalist, she might have "framed her analysis as a frank propo-
sal for legislative amendment of the Voting Rights Act."' 252 In this
case, her work would in effect be a petition to Congress and her role
as citizen-advocate, together with her proposals, would have become
the focus of the debate rather than her actual scholarship.5 3 But
Guinier, Post says, is a utopianist, in part because "[t]he fact that Con-
gress did not and would not enact the statute Guinier had in mind was
to her apparently irrelevant to the validity of her interpretation."'25 4
For Guinier, that interpretation was the best possible one for the Vot-
ing Rights Act.-5
Utopianism rejects devotion to precedent and unquestioning re-
spect for legal institutions as "weak and accommodationist. ' z 6 The
utopianist "conceives the truth of legal arrangements ultimately to be
founded on the legitimacy of moral vision, 257 rather than on the "re-
alistic possibilities of governance" 258 which traditionalists see as the
truth of legal arrangements. Therefore, Guinier's work is not ad-
dressed to Congress, but to judges, who are "implicitly" invited to im-
plement her interpretation of the Voting Rights Act. 5 9 Post believes
that some academes turn to utopian scholarship when "they feel in-
creasingly oppressed and marginalized by the ambient culture [and]
increasingly distrustful of the opportunities of ordinary politics, '260
and that "such alienation lies at the source of Guinier's own work. '261
249. l at 188.
250. Id. at 190.
251. l&
252. 1&.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 188.
255. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
256. Post, supra note 61, at 190.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 191. Guinier, however, states that she does not explore possible remedies
"primarily as judicial solutions." TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrry, supra note 9, at 14. A
court must first find a legal violation before adoption of her proposals is appropriate in a
litigation context. Id. Furthermore, she only "propose[s] these approaches as political so-
lutions if, depending on the local context, they better approximate the goals of democratic
fair play." Id. (emphasis added).
260. Post, supra note 61, at 192.
261. Id.
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Professor Lani Guinier's "truth was literally unspeakable in the
halls of Congress,"26 a view Senator Biden clearly expressed when he
made his political-expediency offer to her through the press. 263 Post
partially blames this state of affairs on the usurpation of utopian
scholarship by academes, especially in the elite schools where "uto-
pian accents have almost become de rigueur.""4 Rather than sticking
to "traditional scholarship [that] is fitting for 'normal lawmaking,' ,265
these academes have "turned en masse" 66 to utopian scholarship.
But because of utopianism's arduous dangerousness,2 67 Post believes
it "ought not to be undertaken lightly; 2 68 instead, it should be "re-
served for the far rarer moments of "'higher lawmaking.' "269 This
wholesale usurpation has in turn debased the reputation of utopian
scholarship which "has all too often come to seem merely political
petulance masquerading as academic expertise," 70 rather than the
"high and serious effort to clarify and reform the purposes of law"2 71
that informs Guinier's work. Consequently, "[t]he searching
resonance of the genre is thus denied to those who are most legiti-
mately pressed to invoke it"2T-people like Guinier.
262. 1& at 187.
263. Senator Biden told the press one day before her name was withdrawn:
"If [Guinier] can come up here and explain herself, convince people that what she
wrote was just a lot of academic musing, who knows? ... I suppose it's conceiva-
ble that she could be confirmed. If she comes up here and says she believes in the
theories that she sets out in her articles and is going to pursue them, not a shot."
Lewis, supra note 197, at Al (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Joseph Biden);
see infra part V.A.3.
264. Post, supra note 61, at 192.
265. Id.
266. Id
267. Because utopian scholarship can "fulfill its promise of legal reformation only by
radically remaking that political will through education or otherwise," id, utopian scholar-
ship exhibits several unique features which sets it apart from traditional scholarship:
[F]irst.... utopian scholarship is arduous. It sets itself the daunting task of funda-
mentally transforming the general political culture as that culture is expressed in
already existing law. Second, utopian scholarship is dangerous because it is po-
tentially filled with hubris. Its practitioners must be prepared to set themselves
over and against the bulk of their political peers, and they thus stand in mortal
danger of succumbing to the will to power. Third, to the extent that we have a
stable political culture, utopian scholarship cannot be routinized and can only
seldom be successful. It cannot be the stuff of ordinary, everyday scholarship.
Id.
268. Id
269. Id.
270. Id. at 193.
271. Id at 192-93.
272. Id at 193.
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But the excuse that posturing academes have given utopianism a
bad name-offered as a reason why Guinier was effectively si-
lenced-is unsatisfactory. Guinier's fate did not depend on her choice
of scholarship style.273
If Guinier's work was in the form of the traditionalist's proposal
for legislative amendment of the Act, in effect a petition to Congress,
Biden would have probably dismissed her work just as quickly, and
maybe even more emphatically, than he did. For example, if Guinier
asserted that her proposal was consistent with established legislative
intent, Biden may have justifiably told the press that "Guinier... got
matters strikingly wrong. Her misapprehension seems so very funda-
mental as to be incomprehensible in so smart and perceptive a
scholar."274 Depending on how alarmed he was by her proposals,
Biden may not have even extended the following offer: Confess to
Congress that your articles were mere "academic musing[s],' 275 little
daydreams scribbled on paper in the ivory tower-and we'll confirm
you. Instead, her "misapprehension" of legislative intent could have
been attacked as a sign she was not qualified for the job. Although
this kind of attack may have had the desired consequence of spotlight-
ing her qualifications, rather than her writings, her first battle would
nonetheless have been to convince everyone that she did not "get it
wrong" before she could move on to touting her successful litigation
record and other accomplishments. Therefore, even if she had taken
the traditionalist tack, the focus may well have remained on her schol-
arship because of the nature of the fight.
c. the impact of race, again
Guinier's subject matter-race-prevented the candidate from
finding a senatorial audience willing to consider her nomination. At-
273. The theory that Senator Biden was reacting t~o a fear that Guinier, if confirmed,
planned to bypass Congress and take her agenda straight to the courts is similarly flawed.
There is no support for either the theory or the fear. Even if this was Guinier's intention,
the Supreme Court's conservative voting rights jurisprudence would have doomed her
chances for success. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993) (holding that "a plain-
tiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a
claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the
basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification"); Presley v. Etowah
County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 830 (1992) (holding that Voting Rights Act did not apply
to "[c]hanges which affect only the distribution of power among officials").
274. Post, supra note 61, at 188.
275. Lewis, supra note 197, at Al (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Joseph
Biden).
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tempting to explain why Judge Bork got a hearing while Guinier did
not, Professor Post theorizes:
Guinier's proposed interpretation of the Voting Rights Act
... was evidently too radical to provoke an analogous debate
[like that involving Judge Bork's work]. Perhaps because is-
sues of race are so highly explosive and because the margin
of publicly acceptable positions is consequently quite con-
stricted, Guinier's views were dismissed out of hand.276
Accepting this as true, one might agree with Post that "[g]iven the
ambient political culture ...Guinier's scholarship was that much
more utopian, 27 7 and therefore, that much more likely to be dis-
missed. Moreover, because Guinier was a utopianist, she could not
employ the shield of academic expertise to help sell her truth to Wash-
ington because utopianism "offers no justification for claiming schol-
arly expertise with respect to the ascertainment and advocacy of
[political] purposes."" Instead, it embraces "the kind of political
perspective appropriate to the citizen. '2 79 Since the Senate may be-
lieve the citizenry lacks the expertise to pronounce the truth about
race relations, it could ignore Guinier's status as an expert on voting
rights.
Nonetheless, Washington would have rejected Guinier's race-
based scholarship had it been cloaked in a traditionalist format in-
stead. First, Post admits that had Guinier been petitioning a congres-
sional audience in the traditionalist vein, she would have been
"regarded as a citizen advocating political change"8 0 from the begin-
ning. This in turn would "have raised issues about the nature of her
politics and her judgment."8 1 Since citizen-advocates are not entitled
to any special claims of expertise, Guinier's attempts to remind the
Senate that she was a legal.specialist would have fallen on deaf ears.
Second, Post completely overlooks the press's crucial role in de-
fining Guinier and her views. The press did not attach any signifi-
cance to whether Guinier was speaking in a utopian or traditionalist
voice-most obviously because the vast majority of the press never
276. Post, supra note 61, at 191.
277. Id. I understand Post to mean that the "radical[ ] remaking [of] political will
through education or otherwise," id. at 192, which is necessary to achieve the goal of legal
reformation, is even more arduous and more dangerous when the law to be reformed in-
volves race.
278. Id. at 194.
279. Id. at 195.
280. IM. at 190.
281. Id.
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read her articles in the first place.2 They simply lifted what other
conservative journalists-with-agendas fed them and spit it back up in
their own papers. But even if they had done their own homework and
thought for themselves, it is unlikely they would have distilled the dif-
ference between the two approaches or attached much significance to
it if they had. And depending on which scholar they relied upon to
aid them in understanding the thrust of the articles, the approach a
candidate used could be manipulated by the advising scholar-either
for or against confirmation.
Lani Guinier, during the press conference she held upon Presi-
dent Clinton's withdrawal of her nomination, echoed the fears of fel-
low scholars when she stated:
"I hope that what has happened to my nomination does not
mean that future nominees will not be allowed to explain
their views as soon as any controversy arises. I hope that we
are not witnessing that dawning of a new intellectual ortho-
doxy in which thoughtful people can no longer debate pro-
vocative ideas without denying the country their talents as
public servants." 3
Instead, she expressed hope that the aftermath of her interrupted con-
firmation process would yield some "'positive lessons.., about the
importance of public dialogue on race in which all perspectives are
represented and in which no one viewpoint monopolizes, distorts, car-
icatures or shapes the outcome.' ,2s4
Candidates with paper trails composed of volatile subjects like
Guinier's, however, will continue to suffer the same kind of end run
around meaningful public discussion of their views unless a new pro-
cedure is adopted for their senate confirmation.
E. The Irony
Public life is a situation of power and energy; he trespasses
against his duty who sleeps upon his watch, as well as he that
goes over to the enemy.285
282. See supra text accompanying notes 137-44.
283. TYRANNY oF =H MAJoRrrY, supra note 9, at 190 (quoting Guinier speaking at
June 4, 1993, Justice Department press conference upon withdrawal of her nomination).
284. Id. (quoting Guinier speaking at June 4, 1993, Justice Department press conference
upon withdrawal of her nomination).
285. EDMUND BuRKE, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, in 2 THE
WRn-INGs AND SPEECHEs OF EDMUND BURKE 251, 320 (Paul Langford ed., 1981) (1770).
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On February 1, 1994, President Clinton nominated Deval Patrick,
a colleague of Guinier's from their days together at the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, to fill the still-vacant Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights position?8 6 Some thought the nomination ironic by vir-
tue of Patrick and Guinier's past work together at the NAACP.28
Guinier commented that the nomination of a fellow ideological col-
league supported her contention that she was "'in the mainstream of
civil rights.' "88 Clint Bolick, however, labeled Patrick a "stealth
Guinier." 89 According to Bolick, anyone affiliated with the NAACP
is suspect because the entire organization is outside the mainstream of
civil rights.2 90 Bolick also lamented the lack of a paper trail to follow
on Patrick.2 91 Indeed, a confident attorney with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund noted that the absence of law review articles meant that
Bolick had "'nothing on Patrick.' "2
Less than two weeks after the Senate confirmed Deval Patrick,
293
Senior Judge Joseph Young of the District of Maryland ordered
Worcester County to use cumulative voting procedures in its election
of county commissioners. 294 Cumulative voting had been one of
Guinier's "controversial" proposals.295
When Bill Clinton was running for the White House, he told Bill
Moyers during an interview he would not compromise on racial equal-
ity.296 One hundred days into his presidency, the polls rated him B+
on race relations.2 97
But when he withdrew Guinier's nomination, he had his own
political survival, not the country's interests, foremost in his mind.298
286. Lynne Duke, Attorney Named to Rights Post Ex-NAACP Litigator Deval Patrick to
Fill Long-Vacant Position, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1994, at Al.
287. Id.
288. Id. (quoting Guinier).
289. Clint Bolick, Civil-Rights Nominee, Quota Clone, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1994, at A18.
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. Nancy E. Roman, Clinton Names New Civil Rights Head, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1994, at A4 (quoting Kerry Scanlon, assistant counsel to NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
293. See 2 Justice Dept Choices Gain Senate Approval, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 23, 1994, at
A17.
294. Cane v. Worcester County, 847 F. Supp. 369,373-74 (D. Md.), aff'd in par4 rev'd in
part on other grounds, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
296. TYRANNY oF THE MAJORrrY, supra note 9, at 190.
297. Jim Norman, Clinton: Room for Improvement, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 1993, at
13A.
298. One White House advisor lobbed a parting shot against Guinier's passionate with-
drawal speech: "'I think Lani forgot' the central point .... 'She thought it was about her
and not about the President. It's an unfortunate set of circumstances that he did not
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What became of President Clinton's desire to further racial equality
through a fully informed public discussion of the issues in which race
plays a part? The President compromised himself, Guinier, and the
country.299
V. THE MESS
"The idea that an academic writes something that's controver-
sial and that this should bar them from public office, this is
insanity. Are we nominating her for the Supreme Court?"
300
A. What If Guinier Had Gotten a Senate Hearing?
1. Other controversial candidates
Lani Guinier was not the only candidate for an executive position
in the spring of 1993 to endure what White House Budget Director
Leon Panetta called "'confirmation hell.' "301 Zoe Baird was Clin-
ton's first nominee for Attorney General, the post ultimately given to
Janet Reno. Baird, on her own initiative,3° brought up the fact that
she and her husband had hired an illegal immigrant to care for their
children and failed to pay Social Security taxes on her wages. 303
"Nannygate" fever struck Washington, 304 and Baird withdrew her can-
didacy.305 The fact that many nominees had committed the same vio-
lation in the past, and been confirmed, °6 was irrelevant. The fact that
another just-confirmed member of Clinton's Cabinet had done the
need."' Gwen Ifill, The Guinier Battle: Anatomy of the Failure to Confirm a Nominee,
N.Y. TImEs, June 5, 1993, at A9 (quoting unidentified White House advisor).
299. In a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll taken from June 4-8, 1993, people surveyed
were evenly split on whether President Clinton "did the right thing" or "the wrong thing"
by withdrawing Guinier's nomination. Poll Update-W.S. Journal/NBC: Perot Has Econ.
Edge Clinton Leads 3-Way, AM. POL. NETwoRK, June 11, 1993, available in WL, APN-
HO database.
300. Steve Goldstein, Clinton's Friend from Yale Law School Days Asked for a Hearing,
but She Was Denied One, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 5, 1993, at Al (quoting White House
Counsel Bernard Nussbaum).
301. See CARTER, supra note 7, at xi (quoting Leon Panetta).
302. Id. at 185.
303. Id. at 7, 25-28.
304. See id. at 6, 17, 26-27.
305. Id, at 167.
306. See id. at 25.
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same thing was also irrelevant." 7 Subsequent nominees 30 8 that spring
would also pay for the mistake of hiring "the wrong babysitter.
30 9
After the Baird withdrawal, Stuart Taylor, soon to distort
Guinier's writings past recognizability,310 reported the full story.
Baird had consulted an attorney before hiring the worker and re-
ported the hiring to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS).311 The INS issued an acknowledgment letter condoning the ar-
rangement, so long as Baird agreed to aid the worker in obtaining
documentation.312 She did not pay Social Security taxes on the
worker's wages because her attorney had erroneously told her that the
Internal Revenue Service would not accept payment until the worker
received a green card and a Social Security number.313 Baird never
had a chance to explain this to the Senate.
San Francisco Supervisor Roberta Achtenberg almost lost the
chance to serve her country in Washington as Assistant Secretary for
Housing and Urban Development-because she was "the first openly
gay person ever chosen for a high-level federal position. ' 31 4 The Sen-
ate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee blocked the
committee vote with the aid of member Jesse Helms,315 who the next
day said he did it "'[b]ecause she's a damn lesbian. I'm not going to
put a lesbian in a position like that. If you want to call me a bigot,
fine.' ,,316 He clarified his reasons for pushing to block a full Senate
vote a few days later by explaining that Achtenberg" 'is not your gar-
den-variety lesbian. She is a militant-activist-mean lesbian.' 13317
307. Id at 26.
308. Among them, United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, who did not
pay Social Security taxes on a formerly employed housekeeper and thus was not nomi-
nated to fill the seat ultimately given to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, id. at 6, and Kimba
Wood, who had not broken any laws, but was nonetheless never formally nominated for
Attorney General because of her nanny problem, id. at 7 & 207 n.3.
309. Id. at 25.
310. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
311. CARTER, supra note 7, at 27.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 28.
314. April Lynch, GOP Senators Prevent Vote on Achtenberg-Opposition to Appoint-
ment Appears to Be Mobilizing, S.F. CHRoN., May 5, 1993, at Al.
315. See id.
316. Al Kamen, Helms on Nominee-"She's a Damn Lesbian", WASH. PosT, May 7,
1993, at A21 (quoting Senator Jesse Helms); J. Jennings Moss, Achtenberg's Name Sent to
Senate; Helms Awaits, WASH. TInms, May 6, 1993, at A3 (quoting Senator Jesse Helms).
317. April Lynch, Helms Says He's Determined to Keep Achtenberg Out of HUD, S.F.
CHRON., May 8, 1993, at A3 (quoting Senator Jesse Helms).
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Fortunately, Helms's hateful comments created a quiet backlash
among some members in the Senate, who worked successfully to keep
the nomination alive by setting a firm date for floor debate.318 During
the floor debate, however, Boy Scouts were brought into the visitor's
gallery as Helms and other senators mentioned their organization re-
peatedly in the context of "what it means to be an American. ' 319 An-
other "visual aid" was a videotaped showing of the 1992 Lesbian and
Gay Freedom Day parade, in which Achtenberg, participating as an
elected official,320 reportedly kissed her lover.32'
This show-and-tell prompted Senator Claiborne Pell to reveal on
the floor that he supported Achtenberg because his own daughter was
a lesbian and president of the Rhode Island Alliance for Gay and Les-
bian Civil Rights, and he did "'not want to see her barred from a
government job merely because of her orientation.' "32 Achtenberg
was ultimately confirmed because of late-blooming senatorial support
such as this.
Finally, there was Webbster Hubbell. Hubbell, a longtime friend
of the President and a former law partner of the First Lady, was nomi-
nated for Associate Attorney General, the number three spot in the
Justice Department.323 Like Guinier, Hubbell was the subject of six
Wall Street Journal editorials.324 Unlike Guinier, his nomination
would end happily.
Shortly after President Clinton made the formal announcement,
Hubbell's membership in the all-white Country Club of Little Rock
318. See id.; April Lynch & Carolyn Lochhead, Fiery Achtenberg Senate Debate Ex-
pected Next Week, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 1993, at A6.
319. April Lynch, Stormy Debate Over Achtenberg-Helms Leads Attack in Senate
Against Gay S.F. Supervisor, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 1993, at A2. During the debate, the
Scouts "nervously fiddled with their uniform neck scarves and looked puzzled upon hear-
ing their organization mentioned over and over. A man who escorted them into the Sen-
ate, however, declined to comment as to how or why the Scouts got there." l
320. April Lynch, Senators Watch Achtenberg in Video of Gay Freedom Parade, S.F.
CHRON., May 19, 1993, at A3.
321. Helen Dewar, Impasse on Clinton Nominees Eases; 8 Confirmed After Mitchell
Chides Senators for Delaying Tactics, WASH. POST, May 19, 1993, at A13; Joyce Price, Stri-
dent Activism Steps on Toes; Video Raises Questions of HUD Nominee's Values, WASH.
TIMEs, May 24, 1993, at Al.
322. Michael Ross, Pell, for Gay Nominee, Says Daughter Is Lesbian, L.A. TIMES, May
22, 1993, at A10 (quoting Senator Claiborne Pell).
323. Jerry Seper, Hubbell Lied, Says NAACP; Effort to Recruit Blacks Disputed, WASH.
TIMES, May 19, 1993, at Al.
324. Summary Overlooked, AM. POL. NETWORK, Mar. 15, 1994, available in WL, APN-
HO database.
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became known.315 The President rushed to Hubbell's defense and re-
fused to consider withdrawing the nomination, despite protests to the
contrary. 26 Hubbell's hearing date before the Senate Judiciary Corn-
mittee was set quickly and remained firm.327 Before his hearing, Hub-
bell was given permission to submit a written statement defending his
membership to the Committee.328 But at the hearing, he unexpect-
edly announced his resignation from the club.329 After that, Hubbell
"glided through the session with little tough questioning. a330 The New
York Times reported that the announcement "drained [the] hearing of
the drama" 331 that might have otherwise occurred.
In a foreboding tone, Senate Judiciary Committee member Orrin
Hatch promised that "'such mild treatment [would not] be re-
peated' ",33 for Guinier. Apparently, Hatch felt mild treatment was
appropriate for a candidate who "relax[ed] in the company of those
who would rather segregate";333 but not for a nominee who had de-
voted her professional life to ending racial discrimination, and who
had once successfully sued Clinton when he was governor of Arkansas
for Voting Rights Act violations.3 4
Guinier, like Hubbell, should have been allowed to make heart-
felt reparations before the Committee. For example, if her articulated
concerns made in a few law review articles about the authenticity of
some black elected officials 335 were offensive, she should have been
allowed to apologize so the Senate could proceed with an analysis of
her qualifications. 336 Clarence Thomas was allowed to apologize at
his first Senate confirmation hearing for commenting that civil rights
325. Al Kamen, Using a (Country) Club Against Hubbell, WASH. PosT, May 10,1993, at
A15. The club did admit one nonwhite member in 1992. Seper, supra note 323, at Al.
326. Seper, supra note 323, at Al.
327. See id. In contrast, although almost one month had elapsed since Clinton nomi-
nated Guinier, no hearing date had yet been set for her hearing. See Seper, supra note 185,
at Al.
328. See Michael Isikoff, McLarty, Two Other Aides, Hubbell Quit Country Club,
WASH. PoST, May 20, 1993, at A10.
329. Hubbel. Not Caught in Any Webb, supra note 175.
330. hL
331. David Johnston, Justice Post Nominee Says He Has Quit Golf Club, N.Y. TRIEs,
May 20, 1993, at A16.
332. Hubbel. Not Caught in Any Webb, supra note 175 (quoting Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee member Orrin Hatch).
333. CARTER, supra note 7, at 44.
334. Id. at 37.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 111-35.
336. CARTER, supra note 7, at 43.
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leaders "'do nothing but bitch, bitch, bitch, moan and moan.' "
Upon doing so, most of the Senate dropped the matter. 8
2. Guinier vs. Bork: treated alike and differently
for all the wrong reasons
The intense scrutiny Lani Guinier's academic writings received in
the press was not unlike Judge Robert Bork's experience during his
failed bid for a Supreme Court Justiceship. The press and partisan
opponents succeeded in distorting the work of both nominees in order
to increase the likelihood of blocking confirmation.339 During
Guinier's "media hearing," one newspaper issued a caveat to its col-
leagues to this effect while also noting the obvious differences be-
tween the two positions:
The error here-as in the case of Bork-is to assume that
what a scholar suggests in an academic article is also what
she will pursue in public office.
No one is about to give the civil rights division the green
light to try and get a court to demand a minority veto over
legislation. Guinier, even if she were so inclined, will not be
allowed to push any radical agenda in litigation.340
President Clinton himself remarked that Guinier would be under the
direct supervision of both himself and Attorney General Janet
Reno. 41 In addition, even if she wanted to pursue some of the alter-
native voting rights remedies she had suggested in her role as a law
professor,342 the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Presley v. Etowah
County Commission, holding that the Voting Rights Act did not
apply to legislative actions,34 "may have rendered her most contro-
versial remedies moot as a litigation tactic."345
Guinier was the nominee for a sub-Cabinet position with limited
authority, not a life-tenured Supreme Court Justiceship. It should
have seemed ridiculous not to schedule and hold a hearing at the first
reasonable opportunity. Instead, unlike Judge Bork, Lani Guinier
never got her "day in court."
337. Id. at 43 (quoting Justice Clarence Thomas).
338. Id
339. Id. at 45, 50-51.
340. No Grounds to Reject This Nominee, Cm. TRIB., May 27, 1993, at A30 (editorial).
341. Lewis, supra note 178, at B9.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
343. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
344. Id. at 830.
345. Leff, supra note 90, at 41.
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After President Reagan nominated Bork, members of Congress
scrutinized his views as formulated in academic writings, and some
drew very negative conclusions. 46 Judge Bork's nomination could
have been discarded at this point. Instead, he was given a full oppor-
tunity to explain, in his own words, his work and his views. Lani
Guinier was not provided the same opportunity; her hearing was held
in the press.
Of course, timing is everything, especially in politics. If Guinier's
nomination to the Justice Department had occurred two or three de-
cades ago, she might have experienced something similar to what
Bork experienced during his earlier confirmation to the powerful So-
licitor General position. During those hearings, Bork's scholarship
was not an issue. He was overwhelmingly confirmed even though
many Senators strongly disagreed with his views because they realized
that Bork "was serving as part of the President's team, not as a free
agent.
347
3. The Biden compromise
In the report filed on Judge Clarence Thomas, Senator Biden,
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee,"4 warned that the" 'burden
of proof' was on the nominee to demonstrate his or her suitability for
the Court and clearly lay out for us his or her methodology for inter-
preting the Constitution." 3 9 He noted that the Senate will normally
defer to the president's selection if made "without regard to ideol-
ogy. '350 Since the Court has moved so far to the right in recent years,
however, the nominee bears the responsibility of informing the Com-
mittee how he or she will "shape the current trend. '351 To do this
adequately, the nominee must "be prepared to discuss with the Judici-
ary Committee, candidly and forthrightly, what [his or her] fundamen-
tal judicial philosophy is. '' 35z Thus, there is careful Senate scrutiny of
346. See Nomination of Robert H Bork to Be an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, S. Exnc. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. vii (1987) [hereinafter Bork
Nomination Report].
347. Leon Friedman & Burt Neuborne, Attack on Civil Rights Nominee Is Unfair, N.Y.
TimEns, June 3, 1993, at A22 (letter to editor). Professor Friedman teaches law at Hofstra
University and Professor Neuborne teaches law at New York University. Id
348. Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, S. ExEc. REP. No. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Thomas
Nomination Report].
349. Id. at 50.
350. Id. at 51.
351. Id.
352. Id.
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paper trails, as in the cases of Bork, Thomas, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
353
In recommending confirmation of David Souter to the United
States Supreme Court, Senator Biden stated: "His vision of the Con-
stitution is not mine-but it is clearly not that of the Court's hard-line
conservatives, either. He is not a man whom I would nominate to the
Court-but he is not a man whose nomination I will oppose. '354 Pro-
fessor Post might characterize this statement as utopian355 since it
reveals Biden's perception of his own political relationship to the
Constitution as one of "transparency.
'356
Biden appears deeply concerned that the majoritarian wishes of
the people remain at center stage as the Supreme Court does its work.
But he is flexible, as illustrated by his statement about Justice Souter.
Senator Biden, however, employed a different standard for Lani
Guinier:
"If she can come up here and explain herself, convince peo-
ple that what she wrote was just a lot of academic musing,
who knows? ... I suppose it's conceivable that she could be
confirmed. If she comes up here and says she believes in the
theories that she sets out in her articles and is going to pur-
sue them, not a shot. '3
5 7
Committee sources were quoted as saying the "'Democratic
party's strategy probably will have Guinier testify that her writing was
hypothetical, legal scholarship.' ",358 Whether this strategy prompted
Biden, a Democrat, to say what he did is unknown. But what is strik-
ing about this statement-aside from the political compromise it of-
353. See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, S. ExEc. REP. No. 6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Thomas Nomina-
tion Report, supra note 348; Bork Nomination Report, supra note 346.
354. Nomination of David H. Souter to Be an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, S. ExEc. REP. No. 32, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1990) [hereinafter Souter
Nomination Report] (emphasis omitted).
355. See supra part IV.D.2.b.
356. See Post, supra note 61, at 193. To illustrate the transparency concept, Post writes
that while grading his students' constitutional law examinations he discovered he "had ap-
parently succeeded only in making the law for [his] students utterly transparent to their
own political will." Id. This was apparent because the students' exams revealed "no gap,
no disjunction, between the Constitution and their own political perspective." Id.
357. Lewis, supra note 197, at Al (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Joseph
Biden).
358. The Clinton Administration-Around the Job Board Achtenberg Debate Begins,
AM. Po- NETwoRx, May 20, 1993, available in WL, APN-HO database (quoting unidenti-
fied Committee source).
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fers-is how inversely it reflects what Biden has said on other
occasions when discussing judicial hearings.
Biden challenged Guinier from the perspective of a practitioner,
who "experience[s] the law as textured and resistant, rather than ...
transparent, '35 9 as utopian scholars experience it. But perhaps the
fact that Guinier was under consideration for an executive position,
rather than a judicial one, is the point. If Biden believed Guinier's
proposals advocated a radical departure from our traditional demo-
cratic processes, at least where voting was concerned, he may have
believed this conflicted with the principle that "even the sovereign is
subject to the rule of law. ' 360 Guinier's responsibilities as a law en-
forcement official is key to the relevancy Biden placed on this princi-
ple. Senator Biden has spoken consistently of his unselfconscious
agenda to implement-or maintain-his political will by seeking to
confirm Supreme Court nominees whose "vision of the Constitu-
tion" 361 he shares. He has unabashedly used the legal institution of
the Senate to advance that agenda. In contradistinction, through his
compromise offer to Guinier, he made it absolutely clear that Guinier
could not use the Justice Department to accomplish the same thing.
If Biden made this statement because he believes law itself is a
kind of "institution situated in a field of competing policies and pur-
poses,' 362 and that the legal practices of the Justice Department
should serve as "mechanisms designed to accommodate and reconcile
these political differences, 363 one could sympathize with the cold ne-
359. Post, supra note 61, at 193.
360. Id at 194.
361. Souter Nomination Report, supra note 354, at 39. In explaining why Judge Thomas
had failed to earn Biden's recommendation for confirmation by the full Senate, Biden said:
Just as the nominee must persuade the President that he or she is the "right
person for the job" before winning the nomination, the nominee must persuade
the Senate that he or she is the right person for the Court before receiving our
votes for confirmation.
In my view, Judge Thomas has not met this burden. It is not that I know for
certain that he will take the Court in troubling new directions; rather, it is that I
have too many doubts about his judicial philosophy to be confident that he will
not. Given what is at stake, and where the Court currently stands, it is a risk we
cannot afford to take, in my view.
How did we arrive at this particular juncture? There is no question that the
aggressive agenda of ultra-conservatives in the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions-an agenda of remaking the Court's protection for individual and property
rights, and for fundamentally altering the balance of power between the branches
of government-lies at the core of the dilemma. The result is that Judge Thomas
is the seventh consecutive conservative Republican nominated to the Court over
the past decade.
Thomas Nomination Report, supra note 348, at 50.
362. Post, supra note 61, at 193.
363. Id. at 193-94.
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cessity of the message. But Biden's refusal to apply the "sovereign is
subject to the rule of law'' 364 principle to the Senate, and his own work
there, reveals his hypocrisy; therefore, this potential justification is in-
adequate to explain his differential treatment of Guinier. 65
Professor Post offers another possible explanation when he
makes the inevitable comparison between Guinier's views and those
of Judge Bork.366 He characterizes Bork as an "aggressively radi-
cal" 367 utopianist36s in his view of the Due Process Clause. The press
and opponents, as in Guinier's case, immediately characterized Bork
as dangerously "out of the mainstream. '369 But as Post points out,
"his views were apparently close enough to provoke a lively debate,
the upshot of which was to relegate Bork's perspective to the periph-
ery of the national political consensus about the meaning of the
Clause. '370 But if they ended up at the periphery when it was all over,
how does that justify the differential treatment Guinier received in
being denied a hearing at all? If both Bork and Guinier wrote their
articles as utopianists, and were criticized as being "out of the main-
stream" based on these articles, then the fact that Guinier was like
Bork cannot explain the disparity. Conversely, this Comment argued
earlier that Senator Biden would not have treated Guinier differently
364. Id. at 194.
365. Of course, Senator Biden is no stranger to the heightened scrutiny he promised
Guinier if she had gone before the Senate. During this time, NBC ran a story on the
intensity of personal scrutiny in politics, "featuring clips of politicians with 'less-than-per-
fect track records,'" including Joseph Biden and Lani Guinier. National Briefing-Paula
Jones: Pro-North Group to Raise Funds for Jones?, AM. POL. NETWoPK, May 11, 1994,
available in WL, APN-HO database (quoting Katie Couric on Today (NBC television
broadcast, May 11, 1994)).
Senator Biden withdrew from the 1988 presidential election when it became public
that he had plagiarized a law review article while in law school. David S. Broder, Biden
Ends Presidential Campaign; Senator Vows to Rebuild Image, Focus on Bork Hearings,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 24, 1987, at Al. Earlier, his candidacy was damaged when videotapes
aired showing Biden giving campaign speeches composed of other people's orations and
lying about his academic record and degrees on the campaign trail. Id. During his with-
drawal speech, Biden said," 'I have to tell you honestly.., it makes me angry.... I am ...
frustrated at the environment of presidential politics that makes it so difficult to let the
American people measure the whole Joe Biden and not just the misstatements that I have
made.'" Id. (quoting Senator Joseph Biden).
366. See Post, supra note 61, at 191.
367. Id.
368. For a definition of utopianism and a discussion of Guinier's work as an example of
this approach, see supra part IV.D.2.b.
369. See Post, supra note 61, at 191.
370. Id.
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had she written her proposals from a traditionalist perspective rather
than a utopianist one. 71
The real reason the President denied Guinier a hearing rests on
several facts unique to Guinier's nomination. First, Guinier's subject
matter is race. Second, the conservative press's organized smear cam-
paign successfully occupied the field of her nomination and pre-
empted the presentation of more balanced perspectives because the
rest of the press engaged in wholesale reliance upon that version as
the truth. 72 Third, no definite hearing date was ever set for Guinier.
Fourth, the Clinton Administration lacked loyalty and organization in
its support of Guinier-attributes that helped both Reagan and
Bush373 get controversial candidates of their own confirmed. Finally,
Guinier was a black woman.374
Senator Biden's comments about Guinier's law review articles,
and his suggestion that she compromise her integrity by repudiating
her work, is also heavily to blame for the premature withdrawal of
Guinier's nomination. Certainly, his conduct, at the very least, en-
couraged the Senate to procrastinate in setting a hearing date. Per-
haps political pragmatism alone motivated Biden's treatment of
Guinier. After all, a hearing would have focused on affirmative action
concepts, a topic that now sends Democrats running for cover.375
But the fact that Guinier's proposals involved the Voting Rights
Act may have also prompted Biden to make the derisive statement he
did.376 If Guinier's proposals were adopted, majoritarian politicians
would have to share their power with minority representatives. Con-
sidering the Senate's refusal to pass legislation initiating campaign fi-
371. See supra notes 273-82 and accompanying text.
372. See supra part Il.C.
373. See infra notes 434-38 and accompanying text.
374. Some commentators believe these personal characteristics played a role in the dif-
ferential treatment she received in the press and from others. See supra notes 146-53, 243-
44 and accompanying text.
375. Lewis, supra note 231, at Al.
376. Lani Guinier expressed this suspicion in a Washington Post article when she
concluded:
In short, many incumbent politicians have learned to live with an interpreta-
tion of the Voting Rights Act in which black voters and their elected officials are
seen but not really heard. The last thing they wanted was [a] debate over race-
neutral alternatives to the current system that would threaten their incumbency.
They apparently don't want to listen to the voices of minority constituents, and
they certainly didn't want to listen to me.
Lani Guinier, What I Would Have Told the Senate, WASH. PosT, June 13, 1993, at C7.
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nance reform,3 77 mandating term limits, 378  or prohibiting
congresspersons from accepting gifts from lobbyists,379 it is not far-
fetched to suggest that Biden was threatened by a scholar who chal-
lenged his continued existence in the Senate.
Professor Post sees the Biden comment as revealing the tension
between truth-the goal of legal scholarship-and governance-the
work of Washington officials.3 80 Because Guinier's truth was unac-
ceptable to the world of politics, 381 "Biden in effect invited Guinier to
convert her truth into a form of [political] expediency, and to
recharacterize her writings as inauthentically constrained by the exter-
nal requirements of academic life."' 382 Thus, the Senate Judiciary
Committee could reject her writings as "mere 'academic musings' ,383
and possibly confirm her.38
It is highly unlikely that Guinier would have struck this bargain
had she gotten a hearing. A few days after Clinton withdrew her
nomination, Guinier penned an editorial in The Washington Post re-
lating what she would have told the Senate. 5 In the piece, she stated
that she "would have applauded with [the Senate and the American
people] the tremendous strides America has made since 1965, but
[she] would have shown them that the Voting Rights Act has not yet
completely succeeded in giving all Americans an equally effective
voice in their government.
386
B. Do Qualifications Matter?
The Advice and Consent Clause, found in Article II, Section 2,
was a compromise.387 Members of the Constitutional Convention
377. See Dan Goodgame, The High Price of Gridlock, Tmm, Oct. 10, 1994, at 28, 32.
378. See Kevin Merida, Popular, Term-Limits Proposal Faces Many Obstacles, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 16, 1994, at A23.
379. See Chronicles: The Week, Timr, Oct. 17, 1994, at 17, 17.
380. Post, supra note 61, at 186.
381. See supra part IV.D.2.b-c.
382. Post, supra note 61, at 187.
383. Id.
384. At least Biden offered Guinier the choice of repudiating her vision of democracy in
exchange for confirmation. He is less supportive today of President Clinton's nominations.
Biden recently told the press that rather than explore the merits of a nomination, he will
automatically oppose any nominee he feels the Administration failed to research ade-
quately. MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1995) (televising
Senator Biden's comments to press on nomination of Dr. Henry Foster to replace Dr.
Jocelyn Elders as Surgeon General).
385. See Guinier, supra note 376, at C7.
386. Id.
387. CARTER, supra note 7, at 12.
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feared that vesting too much appointment power in the president
would violate the separation of power among the three branches. 8
The solution was to ensure congressional participation in the appoint-
ment process by requiring the president to receive senatorial advice
regarding potential nominees and senatorial confirmation of formally
announced candidates.38 9 Since George Washington's Administra-
tion, however, debate has raged over what exactly constitutes ad-
vice.390 Until President Rutherford B. Hayes took office in 1877,
Congress and the president negotiated the identity of the entire Cabi-
net before any formal nominations were made. 91 Thus, controversial
candidates were virtually nonexistent,391 and the bargained-for nomi-
nees were easily confirmed.
President Hayes abolished this system and replaced it with one of
presidential prerogative. 93 He refused to recognize Congress's right
to contribute significantly to the nomination process; instead, he
staffed the Cabinet with whom he pleased.
94 This "accident[al] ' 395
interpretation of the congressional advice function has survived, in its
basic form, today. The consequence is, as Professor Stephen L. Carter
says, that "the President seeks advice principally from political coun-
selors-all too rarely from the Senate-and then springs names on
the nation like birthday gifts, only to grow sullen and snappish when
the recipients (we the people) are ungrateful. '396 Thus, Congress is
left in a reactive, rather than an advisory, role. 97 Worst of all, if the
president and his or her staff fail to perform adequate research on the
nominee, or fail to anticipate congressional concern over facets of the
candidate's background, the candidate becomes the centerpiece in
borking contests between the White House and Congress.398
Carter believes the current system corners Congress into a to-
bork-or-not-to-bork role for executive confirmations, as opposed to
an active role assessing the candidate's qualifications for the job, be-
cause protestations grounded on an absence of qualifications lack
388. Id.
389. See id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 12-13, 34-35.
392. Id at 35. Only four nominees for Cabinet positions were withdrawn in the nine-
teenth century. Id
393. See id at 34-35.
394. Id
395. Id at 14.
396. Id. at 13.
397. Id at 35.
398. See id. at 13.
April 1995] 1187
1188 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
political credibility.399 In the rare instance when qualifications are
brought up regarding a Cabinet nominee, it is really "code for some-
thing else."4 ' On the other hand, if concern exists that a nominee is
actually unqualified, the relevant Senate committee launches a frantic
stealth investigation into the nominee's life in an effort to dig up some
dirt.
401
The appointment process has degenerated into a search for dis-
qualifying factors that have no connection with a nominee's ability to
do the job:40 2 Roberta Achtenberg nearly suffered defeat because she
was a lesbian;40 3 Zoe Baird was unfairly singled out and forced to
withdraw because of nanny problems; 4 4 and while Webbster Hub-
bell's membership in a segregated country club was not severe enough
to disqualify him,405 Lani Guinier's suggestions for voting rights reme-
dies were enough to disqualify her.
406
Guinier's nomination experience was unusual for a candidate to a
sub-Cabinet position. Executive candidates are rarely subject to scru-
tiny about their substantive legal and policy views;407 this scrutiny is
usually reserved for Supreme Court nominees.408 The operative phi-
losophy underlying the confirmation process for both sets of candi-
dates, however, is that serving the country is considered a reward, one
that must be deserved, rather than a calling.40 9 This approach is a
mistake. Professor Carter believes the country got stuck in this ap-
proach partly because "we the people" are aware that, in modern
times, we lack any real control over how the federal government is
run; thus, the confirmation process is our only chance to see who is
actually running the country.410 But since "[w]e as a nation, like the
Senate as a body, share no consensus on what qualifications a nomi-
nee ought to have, for the Supreme Court or for anything else[ ] ...
we have to spend [our] time arguing over whether candidates are dis-
qualified instead of whether they are qualified."41'
399. Id. at 34.
400. Md at 165.
401. See id.
402. IL at 9, 20-22, 24, 163.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 314-22.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 302-13.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 323-34.
406. See supra part 1V.A-B.
407. See CARTER, supra note 7, at 9, 29, 31-32.
408. Id at 15, 19, 21-22, 29.
409. Id. at 29, 185.
410. Id at 15.
411. Id at 162-63.
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Disqualifying factors tend to be private transgressions or facts
which provide fertile opportunities for moral indignation to surface
and thus defeat the nomination.412 Television becomes our "backyard
fence,1413 and scrutiny degenerates into "gossip. '414 But Professor
Carter says our indignation is not unleashed consistently; instead, it
"strikes, cancer-like, almost randomly. " 415 This is one reason why the
"disqualification game '4 16 is such a poor substitute for meaningful
analysis of a candidate's job qualifications. We must return to a sys-
tem that more accurately reflects the intent of the Framers, a system
where intelligent congressional involvement during the nomination
phase complements an informed inquiry into a candidate's job qualifi-
cations during the confirmation phase.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR ExEcuTIVE CONFIRMATION REFORM
The Republican form of government is the highest form of
government; but because of this it requires the highest type of
human nature-a type nowhere at present existing.
417
While the controversy rages over whether and to what extent the
judicial confirmation process needs reforming,41 8 very little has been
said about a parallel need to reform the process for executive branch
412. See id. at 8, 11 ("[T]he reason that opponents try to paint controversial nominees as
sinners, as personally venal, is that they know the American people, the world's strongest
supporters of capital punishment, like to see the sinful destoyed; we the people of the
United States do not like to forgive.").
413. See id. at 18.
414. See id
415. Id at 29.
416. Id
417. HERBERT SPENCER, The Americans, in 2 ESSAYS: Scmrnmc, PoLTICAL, AND
SPECULATVE 471, 478-79 (library ed., D. Appleton & Co. 1904) (1883).
418. See, e.g., CARER, supra note 7; SENATOR PAUL SiMON, ADVICE & CONSENT-
CLARENCE THOMAs, ROBERT BoRK AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S NOMINATION BATTES (1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORA-
BLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY
(1985); Senator Dennis DeConcini, Examining the Judicial Nomination Process: The Poli-
tics of Advice and Consent, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 1 (1992); Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Jus-
tice: A Commentary on the Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 969 (1992); John 0. McGinnis, The Presiden4 the Senate, the Constitution,
and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REv.
633 (1993); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101
HAv. L. REv. 1202 (1988); Mark C. Rahdert, The Toughest Job Interview in the Land, 2
TEMP. POL. & Crv. Rrs. L. REv. 293 (1993) (reviewing SIMON, supra); Ronald D. Rotunda,
The Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Justices in the Modem Era, 37 EMORY L.J.
559 (1988); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.. 1491 (1992).
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positions. 1 9 Lani Guinier's experience, especially when contrasted
with similar executive appointments that ended quite differently,420
cries out for a similar reform push for the executive confirmation pro-
cess as well.
A. The Basic Proposal
To preserve the Senate's advice and consent function regarding
candidates whom the president has seen fit to nominate, this Com-
ment proposes that Congress adopt a new Senate Rule mandating that
a hearing be set within a fixed, but reasonable, number of days after
the president makes a formal announcement. The nominee is then
"guaranteed" a Senate hearing, if the candidate so desires one. This
procedure produces several results.
First, it protects the president's constitutional right to withdraw
nominations from consideration by the Senate.421 Second, it nonethe-
less discourages the president from taking such action before nomi-
nees have the. opportunity to appear before the appropriate
committee, for the reasons articulated below. Third, it aids the coun-
try's ability to attract outstanding individuals to public service.
Fourth, it provides nominees both an appropriately respectful and for-
mal forum to answer all questions and concerns regarding their quali-
fications and fitness for positions.4 2 Fifth, it protects nominees from
arbitrary sacrifice if their nominations proceed at a vulnerable time
for the president. Finally, this process assures the American public
that democratic principles so often referred to in presidential and sen-
atorial speeches-notions of fair play, the chance for the individual to
be heard, and tolerance for the exchange, rather than the suppression,
of ideas-are principles that guide the speakers of such ideals.
Of course, the president may decide after nominating the candi-
date to withdraw the nomination, as occurred with Guinier. Nonethe-
less, a quickly set and firm hearing date may discourage the president
from taking such action since withdrawal under these circumstances
may provoke more public criticism of the president than the nomina-
tion itself. When President Clinton withdrew Lani Guinier's nomina-
419. For one such rare example, see CARTER, supra note 7.
420. See supra notes 314-31 and accompanying text.
421. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
422. This process is far more desirable than the humiliating, time-crunched forum that
Nightline provided to Lani Guinier-the only public opportunity Guinier was given to
defend herself before her nomination was withdrawn. See supra notes 211-16 and accom-
panying text.
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tion before her hearing, he was widely criticized for his indecisiveness,
skewed sense of fair play, and undemocratic stifling of ideas.423 Fur-
thermore, fears surfaced that survival politics was turning the process
into a bankrupt exercise, and that qualified candidates with paper
trails would quickly become an endangered species.424 The reform
proposed in this Comment encourages the president to stand by an
outstanding nominee during the vulnerable period before the Senate
hearings take place.
B. Encouraging More Frequent Use of Professor Stephen L.
Carter's "Cures" When the Nominee Loses Public Respect
1. The "low-risk cure"4'
Professor Carter believes that a nominee's supporters should
have the burden of making the candidate's case for confirmation.
4 2 6 If
this approach is followed, the Senate could reject nominees solely be-
cause their supporters have not presented a persuasive and convincing
case.427 Thus, opponents in the Senate, the press, and the public could
get away from the current bad habit of "search[ing] for that single
tantalizing disqualifier with which one hopes to spark a firestorm of
criticism"428 because nominees would no longer enjoy presumptions
of fitness. When a nominee's reputation is borked, however, and a
loss of public respect ensues, the president should, in rare cases, effec-
tuate a "low-risk cure" by personally making the case for the nomi-
nee.429 Such a cure would have benefitted both Professor Guinier and
Judge Bork.43 Of course, as Professor Carter points out, Presidents
Clinton and Reagan may have decided against spending limited polit-
ical capital in this manner because each felt he had "more important
fish to fry."43' Yet, President Clinton stood by Webbster Hubbell dur-
ing the same time period for a much less defensible problem.432 Simi-
423. See supra notes 219, 225-39 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 90, 243-46 283-84 and accompanying text.
425. CARTER, supra note 7, at 168.
426. Id. at 159. Senatorial support for presidential nominations can be difficult to come
by, even when the president's own party controls the White House. See supra note 384.
Instead, partisan senators may wait to see if any problems emerge with the nomination; if
so, they can refuse to support the nominee and preserve their own political survival.
427. CARTER, supra note 7, at 159.
428. Id.
429. See id. at 168.
430. See id.
431. Id.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 325-26.
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lar support for Guinier would have increased her chance for
confirmation.
433
Presidential support of his or her nominee can be decisive. Com-
pare President Clinton's handling of the Guinier nomination with
President Bush's unflinching support of Clarence Thomas. Bush's re-
lentless public support of Judge Thomas throughout the confirmation
process-both before and after the Anita Hill scandal434 -involved a
personal risk to the credibility of Bush's political and presidential
judgment. Thomas's nomination was clearly in jeopardy and confir-
mation victory was not assured.435 But Bush's unwavering support,
along with a well-orchestrated White House offensive strategy,
436
played a critical role in raising doubts about Thomas's critics and the
allegations lodged against him and inspired the public's demand for
senatorial fair play and a second hearing.437 Thomas was subse-
quently confirmed. 438
2. The "high-risk cure
'439
Assuming the president is sufficiently deterred from prematurely
withdrawing the nomination, adopting the "guaranteed" hearing pro-
cedure also assures the nominee a chance to articulate his or her pol-
icy and jurisprudential views before the Senate. The Senate, the press,
and the citizenry will then be given the crucial "other side" as the
nominee is allowed to personally counter the biased interpretations of
partisan opponents and reporters in the press. This creates the poten-
tial for Professor Carter's senatorial "high-risk cure" n0 to work its
433. After the withdrawal, Jesse Jackson argued, "'If President Clinton and Senate
Democrats had stood by Lani as President Bush and the Republicans stood by Clarence
Thomas, she would be confirmed.'" Lewis, supra note 231, at Al (quoting Jesse Jackson).
But see CARTER, supra note 7, at 167 ("[D]espite the anguish it created in Lani Guinier's
supporters (myself included), President Clinton may have been correct when he made the
choice to withdraw her nomination if he thought the vicious campaign against her had
made it impossible for her to do the job effectively.").
434. See Jack Nelson, Democrats Failed to Protect Hill from GOP, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1991, at A7, A9; David G. Savage & Douglas Jehl, Bush Confident on Thomas Vote; Key
Senators Silent, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at Al, A6.
435. See Edwin Chen & Douglas Frantz, Support for Thomas Holds Despite Charges,
L.A. TlMras, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al, A16; Savage & Jehl, supra note 434, at Al, A6.
436. Nelson, supra note 434, at A7, A9.
437. See CARTER, supra note 7, at 13-14.
438. Justice Clarence Thomas was confirmed on October 15, 1991, by a vote of 52 to 48.
Melissa Healy & Edwin Chen, Thomas Confirmed, 52 to 48: It Is Now a "Time for Heal-
ing," the New Justice Says, L.A. Timm, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al. The vote was the closest in
this century. Id.
439. CARTER, supra note 7, at 168.
440. 1&
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magic. If the nominee suffers a loss of public respect due to distortion
of her views,4" 1 senators might "invest their own political capital by
voting to confirm the nominee because of a faith that the nominee's
performance will be so spectacular that the public will quickly regain
the faith it has lost."" 2 Some senators relied on exactly this in voting
to confirm Clarence Thomas.443 Lani Guinier was a much more de-
serving candidate for such a cure,4 " and she should have been given
the opportunity to obtain it.
C. The Effect on Executive and Legislative Players
Critics of this proposal may argue that what is best for the coun-
try is maximum flexibility for the president and that this proposal re-
stricts this "presidential prerogative."" 5 As argued above, however,
the problem with our current presidential prerogative model is that
the Senate is left in a reactive, rather than an advisory, role. This is
antithetical to the original and historical understanding of the Senate's
advisory function." 6 The model also perpetuates borking contests be-
tween the White House and Congress.447
Supporters of a new Senate Rule implementing a hearing date
mechanism may nonetheless contend that the rule will fail to eradicate
any of the problems highlighted by the Guinier events. The president
could simply leak a name to the Senate before any formal announce-
ment is made. If the name generates strong negative reaction, the
president simply discards the potential nominee and floats another
name. This would circumvent the required hearing date and deny the
discarded nominee a formal hearing.
Several factors counter this criticism. First, leaking a name to test
the waters before a formal announcement is not something new. This
occurs regularly and can be viewed as fulfilling the senatorial "advice"
function.448 Second, an increase in leaks from the White House is not
inherently bad.
441. Id- at 168-69.
442. Id
443. 1d at 169.
444. Lani Guinier never suffered from criticism that she lacked the basic tools necessary
for the job, as Thomas did. See id. at 137. Nor was Guinier accused of having committed
morally repugnant acts, as Thomas was accused of sexual harassment. Most importantly,
the legitimacy of an entire institution like the Supreme Court was not at stake. See id. at
168.
445. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 387-97 and accompanying text.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 398-406.
448. See supra notes 387-92 and accompanying text.
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Consider a scenario that could have resulted from a leak in the
Guinier case. Assume that some members of Congress were familiar
with Guinier's writings and proposals. Opponents could have imme-
diately presented their reservations to the President, who could have
reviewed Guinier's works before the press distorted the facts.449 The
President's supporters on Capitol Hill would also have the initiative to
study her articles. An unbiased reading would have undoubtedly gen-
erated supporters, who could then provide critical assistance to
Guinier.450 The existence of alternative interpretations of Guinier's
ideas might have compelled the President to consult Guinier person-
ally, a courtesy denied her. If consulted, Guinier could have precisely
explained her views. If not consulted, the mere existence of more pos-
itive interpretations may have motivated the President to nominate
her. The White House could then take the offensive and anticipate
attacks by the conservative press and other partisan opponents. By
flooding the media with Guinier's true views upon the announcement,
the Administration would succeed in defining the nominee before its
enemies did.45'
449. It is unclear how thoroughly President Clinton read Guinier's writings. During the
press conference announcing his withdrawal of her nomination, he stated he had not read
her work before nominating her. Transcript of President Clinton's Announcement, supra
note 223, at A19. He asserted later in the speech he had carefully reread her articles that
day. l. What is clear is that neither Clinton nor the White House staff ever understood
Guinier's proposals. During the same press conference, the President stated he was drop-
ping Guinier because she advocated "'principles of proportional representation and mi-
nority veto as general remedies that I think inappropriate as general remedies and anti-
democratic, very difficult to defend.'" Marcus, supra note 89, at Al (quoting President
Clinton).
Guinier does not advocate these solutions as general remedies. Instead, her remedies
are limited "to extreme cases of racial discrimination at the local level." TYRNNv oF TaM
MAJoRrry, supra note 9, at 109. Furthermore, Guinier proposes adoption of her solutions
on a legislative level only if "depending on the local context, they better approximate the
goals of democratic fair play." Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Allowing congressional partici-
pation at the informal consideration stage by discussing possible nominees with members
of the Senate will increase the possibility that the White House will accurately interpret a
nominee's views.
450. One commentator later compared Clarence Thomas, who "'had a staunch, un-
flinching champion in Senator Jack Danforth and a supportive White House,'" with
Guinier, who "'had nobody on Capitol Hill for her, and the White House was distracted,
disorganized, and in disarray.'" Carter, supra note 94, at xi (quoting political commenta-
tor Mark Shields).
451. See supra text accompanying note 237. The crucial difference between leaking the
name of a possible nominee and making a formal nomination is that the president controls
the timetable in the first case, but not in the second. By floating the name of a nominee,
the president can take as much time as he or she wants to further research the nominee
without fighting an attack by opponents. But once a formal nomination is made, the presi-
dent may be under pressure to act, possibly by withdrawing the nominee's name, before
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If the President, after speaking with Senate members, believed he
could not support Guinier because he did not agree with her views or
lacked enough congressional support, the White House could simply
float another name. Testing the waters would have saved both the
President and Guinier great humiliation and embarrassment.
D. The Effect on the Press
Assume a different situation. None of the parties privileged to
the leak know about Guinier's writings or their potential for contro-
versy. The President decides to make a formal announcement and the
Senate sets a hearing date within a few days, as mandated by the new
Rule. Some writers in the press then begin their smear campaign. But
the fixed hearing date motivates other members of the press-and the
Senate-to evaluate the nominee's work, aware that the hearing is on
its way and that blind reliance on the Wall Street Journal's interpreta-
tion will not suffice. The press will realize they are now expected to
independently cover the articles-not just report the controversy45 2-
since the nominee's writings will most likely be scrutinized carefully at
the upcoming hearing. Instead, the lack of any definite hearing date
gave opposition newspapers immense confidence to skewer as many
of Guinier's views as they liked, secure in their knowledge that if they
created enough controversy, there would be no hearing at all. A fixed
hearing date should encourage a dialogue both in the press and be-
tween partisans in the days leading up to the hearing while taking
some of the heat off the president.
Adoption of this easily implemented proposal will stave off re-
peats of the Guinier fiasco. Conservatives in the press initiated a
smear campaign to brand Guinier unacceptable for office.453 Major
national newspapers repeated the attacks verbatim.454 Partisan oppo-
nents reiterated the charges on a daily basis.455 An inexperienced
White House staff, caught off guard, accidentally furthered the dam-
age and legitimized Guinier's betrayal by the President who was also
her friend-first, through the confession that he was not familiar with
the Senate can hold a hearing to vote on confirmation or rejection. In these cases, as in
Guinier's, the "hearing" will be held in the press.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 145. For one high court reporter's view of the
press's critical role in the confirmation process, see Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Pro-
cess and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1213 (1988).
453. See supra part HI.B.
454. See supra part II.C.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 174-78.
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her work, and second, by admitting he could not endorse her nomina-
tion after he had ostensibly read her articles. 45 6
VII. CONCLUSION
A procedure fixing firm hearing dates shortly after nominees are
announced will give candidates a better chance of retaining their out-
standing professional and personal reputations, regardless of whether
they are ultimately confirmed. The chilling effect on academic speech
currently felt in the law schools will thaw. Scholars will continue to
take risks in their writing, seeing that criticism of a candidate's ideas
during the confirmation process is routinely rebutted with the candi-
date's own speech. Most importantly, we the people will benefit by
attracting, and getting, the best and the brightest public servants this
country has to offer.
Krista Helfferich*
456. See supra notes 223, 449 and accompanying text.
* I would like to thank Tal 0. Vigderson for his sharp insights, patience, and love
during the publication process; Professor Christopher N. May for his crucial direction and
guidance during various draft stages; and the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review staff and
editors for their excellent suggestions and editing.
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